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ABSTRACT
With the endorsement of the Guiding Principles regarding the issue
of business and human rights, an important chapter has come to a
close. Beginning with the then U.N. Secretary-General’s “global
compact” speech in 1999, the international legal framework for
business and human rights has undergone tremendous change and
progress. Yet, for all these developments, there has been no
exhaustive examination in the legal academy of all of these events;
certainly there is no one piece that discusses or analyzes all the
major instruments that have been proposed and endorsed by the U.N.
on the subject of business and its relationship with human rights
issues. This Article attempts to fill that gap. By documenting the rise
and development of Transnational Corporations as potential subjects
under international law, the Article will help to provide a
comprehensive overview of the issues concerning Transnational
Corporations and businesses for the last twelve years. In addition, by
examining the Guiding Principles through the lens of bystander
rhetoric, this Article hopes to point the way forward to the next

* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. Thanks to
Kareem Amerson, Larry Catá Backer, Robert Bastress, Christine Bader, Gregory
Bowman, andré douglas pond cummings, Anne Lofaso, Alison Peck, William Rhee,
and Ruthann Robson. Many thanks also go to Emily Moy and Jamie Ritton for
extraordinary research assistance, and thanks and high praise go to Bertha Romine for
her amazing assistance and proofreading skills. In addition, this work was assisted
greatly by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, whose compilations of
many of the source documents on business and human rights have been a significant
development for researchers in this area. This work was supported by the Bloom
Faculty Research Grant. The author also would like to thank WVU College of Law for
its support of this project.

871

872

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

phase in developing a meaningful accountability structure for TNCs
under international law.
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INTRODUCTION
Ruggie has gone to great lengths to analyze the environment in
which multinational corporations operate today, particularly what
he calls ‘governance gaps’ or ‘weak governance zones’—areas
where few of the underpinnings of law and order exist. ‘This
authority vacuum, or governance gap, often leads responsible
companies to stumble when faced with some of the most difficult
choices imaginable, or to try and perform de facto governmental
roles in local communities for which they are ill-equipped. Less
responsible firms take advantage of the asymmetry of power they
enjoy to do as they will.1

On June 16, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously
endorsed2 the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(“Guiding Principles” or “Principles”).3 With its vote to endorse these
principles, an era of seismic shifts regarding business and human rights
came to an end. In a matter of twelve years, the landscape of
international human rights law changed dramatically. In this time frame,
Transnational Corporations (“TNCs”) went from lurking in the shadows
of the human rights debate, to being placed on the United Nations’
center stage, a spotlight firmly fixed upon them.4 Much of that change
came at the hand of John Ruggie and his team. Acting as Special
Representative5 to the U.N. on business and human rights6 issues from
1. Robert A. Senser, Big Business and the U.N.: Toward a New Framework for
Corporate Responsibility, AM. THE NAT’L CATHOLIC WKLY., Dec. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.americanmagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11253 (internal
quotes omitted).
2. Scott Jerbi, U.N. Adopts Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights –
What Comes Next?, IHRB (Jun. 17, 2011), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/un_a
dopts_guiding_principles_on_business_and_human_rights.html.
3. These Principles were drafted by Special Representative John Ruggie.
4. See, e.g., Olivia Ward, 60 Years Later, Fight for Rights Carries on; in an Era
of Turmoil, Many Wonder Whether the U.N.’s Universal Vow is a Work in Progress,
THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 2008, at AA.1.
5. The U.N. frequently appoints people to act as Special Representatives for
various missions or mandates that it wants to complete. For a sample list, see Special
and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, the Americas,
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/srsg/americas.htm (last visited Jan.
3, 2012). The Special Representative acts at the behest of the appointing body at the
U.N., performing various tasks and acting as a spokesperson for the U.N. within the
scope of their mandate. In this instance, then Secretary-General Kofi Anan appointed
John Ruggie as the Special Representative on the issue of human rights and
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2005–2011, Ruggie analyzed the problems that plague TNCs regarding
human rights issues and set forth his proposal to help solve the
problem.7
However, while Ruggie’s work is transformational, it is still
incomplete.8 The Guiding Principles are significant, but they are nonTransnational Corporations. See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, SecretaryGeneral Appoints John Ruggie of United States, Special Representative on Issue of
Hum. Rts., Transnat’l Corp., other Bus. Enter., U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July 28,
2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm.
6. Generally speaking, the term business and human rights encompasses a broad
range of activity relating to such diverse matters as trade, labor, and corporate
governance. The idea underlying the term is that business entities are somehow
implicated in circumstances that raise human rights issues. In this Article, I will use the
term broadly, discussing TNCs’ responsibility and potential accountability within the
context of human rights violations.
7. Ruggie’s contributions came under two mandates created by the U.N. Human
Rights Council. The first mandate, which was created in April 2005, requested among
other things that the Special Representative “identify[] and clarify[] existing standards
of corporate responsibility and accountability with regard to human rights.” Id. The
second mandate, which the U.N. issued after Ruggie completed his first mandate,
requested that Ruggie provide recommendations to the Council on operationalizing the
framework for business and human rights. Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business
and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr.
9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf.
Although the U.N. issued two separate mandates, Ruggie often refers to them as one
mandate in interviews. See Interview by John Sherman with Professor John Ruggie,
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Bus. & Hum. Rts, Int’l Bar
Ass’n Webcast (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=4b5233cb-f4b9-4fcd-9779-77e7e85e4d83 [hereinafter Interview by John
Sherman].
8. Ruggie himself acknowledges this. In the Guiding Principles, he states
“Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles, by itself, will not bring business and
human rights challenges to an end. But it will mark the end of the beginning.” Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp.
and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum.
Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf [hereinafter
Guiding Principles].
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binding. Victims of human rights abuses who lack the means of redress
in their domestic sphere are still largely unable to turn to international
law in order to hold TNCs accountable for their role in the abuse. This
can lead to significant human rights abuses left unchecked, particularly
in weak governance zones, where the State itself either perpetrates the
abuse or is unwilling to stop the aggressor. While many are hopeful that
Ruggie has laid the foundation in the Principles for future accountability
mechanisms, the Principles themselves reject this as an appropriate use
of its framework.
Previously, I have proposed a new paradigm for looking at TNCs9
under international law, namely that of a bystander.10 The basis for my
proposal was that TNCs employ the rhetoric of the bystander to try to
avoid responsibility for human rights violations under international law
by confusing and dominating the dialogue on corporate accountability.11
I maintained that until we find an accountability framework that
incorporated the bystander name, TNCs would continue to control the
debate regarding their role in human rights abuses and prevent the
creation of an accountability framework that incorporates TNCs.12
Examining the Guiding Principles from a bystander perspective will
9. Transnational Corporations is just one of many terms that have been employed
for this corporate structure. Other terms, such as multi-business enterprises and
multinational corporations, are also used. I adopt the use of Transnational Corporations
for two reasons: 1) this term has appeared most often in my review of the United
Nations’ documents themselves; and 2) TNC most accurately conveys the jurisdictional
uniqueness of these enterprises in my view. In addition, in Ruggie’s first official report
to the Human Rights Council, he points out that oftentimes state-owned companies or
business enterprises that reside in only one jurisdiction are the greatest abusers of
human rights. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum.
Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business and Human Rights: Mapping
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, Hum.
Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/ReportstoUNHumanRig
htsCouncil/2007 [hereinafter 2007 Report]. While that may be true, from an
accountability standpoint, intrastate corporations do not present the same accountability
issues that arise when corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions. These latter issues
are my focus in this Article.
10. See Jena Martin Amerson, What’s in a Name? Transnational Corporations and
Bystanders Under International Law, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2011).
11. At its core, the TNC’s bystander strategy is the following: in the wake of
accusations from human rights advocates, TNCs maintain that they were merely
bystanders (i.e., innocent third parties) to the underlying events, helpless to stop the
tragedy from occurring. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
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further enhance the discussion on the best accountability paradigms for
TNCs in the realm of human rights abuses.
Using mainly primary source materials (such as the U.N.’s own
foundational documents and contemporaneous articles and commentary
from that time period),13 this article will examine the short history14 of
business and human rights at the U.N. and analyze the impact that its
work will have on international human rights law generally, as well as
the bystander paradigm specifically. While the Guiding Principles
represent a significant step forward in the area of business and human
rights, more work needs to be done at the foundational level before
business and human rights law becomes firmly entrenched at the
international level. By analyzing these new normative goals from a
bystander perspective, I hope to advance the debate regarding a feasible
accountability model for TNCs under international law.
Part I of this Article offers some background on the bystander
paradigm for TNCs. Part II provides a comprehensive15 documentation

13. In the introduction to his 2008 Official Report to the Human Right Council,
Ruggie stated that “the international community is still in the early stages of adapting
the human rights regime to provide more effective protection to individuals and
communities against corporate-related human rights harm.” Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus.
Enter., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶
1, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie),
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Human_R
ights_Working_Group/29Apr08_7_Report_of_SRSG_to_HRC.pdf [hereinafter Respect
Framework]. Because scholarship in this area is still in its infancy, and given that most
of the work on this subject for the last twelve years has come from the Special
Representative’s office, examining the developments under Ruggie’s mandates is most
effective for this Article’s assessment of business and human rights issues.
14. While there are many U.N. mandates and treaties that inform the issue of
business and human rights, this Article will focus primarily on those that specifically
address corporate responsibility—namely the U.N. Norms, The U.N. Global Compact,
and the reports produced by Special Representative John Ruggie.
15. Comprehensive, but not exhaustive, Ruggie’s work alone in the last six years
has generated hundreds of reports, addenda, responses, commentaries and workshop
projects. A thorough analysis of each is beyond the scope of this Article. For a list of all
the documents that were prepared by or submitted to Ruggie in connection with his
work, see List of Documents Prepared by and Submitted to SRSG on Business and
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of the seismic shift that has occurred in the area of business and human
rights in the last twelve years. While this section begins with Kofi
Annan’s declaration regarding business and human rights through the
work of the Global Compact, it will focus primarily on the U.N. Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Entities with Regard to Human Rights (“U.N. Norms”) and its
aftermath—specifically examining the work of Special Representative
John Ruggie and his mandates. Part III of this Article analyzes the
Guiding Principles—the culmination of Ruggie’s mandates—and
discusses how the three pillars (“Protect,” “Respect,” and “Remedy”)
upon which the Guiding Principles are based affect the bystander
paradigm. Part IV offers an analysis of the Guiding Principles,
examining how it compares to its main predecessor, the U.N. Norms, as
well as how it has had an impact on the bystander framework.
That the Guiding Principles will likely have an impact on
international human rights law—now and in the future—is a premise
beyond dispute. Thus, the Principles are truly the end of the beginning.
Nonetheless, until a workable accountability framework is developed,
the end of the beginning is all we have.
I. THE BYSTANDER BACKGROUND
One of the long-standing struggles that scholars and advocates have
wrestled with are TNCs’ position in the international legal framework
with respect to human rights violations.16 These violations are
Human Rights (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-docs-list.pdf
[hereinafter Document List]. This list is current as of August 2010.
16. One of the most comprehensive discussions of this issue comes from Steven
Ratner. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). Other scholars have also joined the
discussion over the years. See, e.g., Nien-hê Hsieh, The Obligations of Transnational
Corporations: Rawlsian Justice and the Duty of Assistance, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 4,
643–661 (2004); Kenneth Paul Kinyua, The Accountability of Multinational
Corporations for Human Rights Violations: A Critical Analysis of Select Mechanisms
and Their Potential to Protect Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Developing
Countries (Working Paper Series No. K33, Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599842 (critically analyzing the effectiveness of
the U.N. Human Rights Norms as a development in customary international law);
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004)
(arguing that the current state-based framework for human rights accountability is
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numerous. Among them are torture, gender discrimination, labor rights
violations and environmental harm.17 They also arise in numerous
scenarios. For example, villagers are subject to rape, torture, and death
after a TNC begins operations in their village; afterwards, the TNC may
disavow any involvement.18 An explosion at a plant in India causes
thousands of deaths and incalculable harm to the environment; corporate
executives in the U.S. disclaim any legal responsibility.19 Riots and
deaths come after a TNC wins a contract to privatize Bolivia’s water,
and Bolivians are denied access to water at a reasonable price; yet the
TNC claims that it was not involved in any of the actions that led to the
abuses.20 To compound the complexity, there is no current legal
inadequate and duties for TNCs under international law should be implemented); Paul
Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting
and Compliance, 37 INT’L LAW. 69 (2003) (arguing for an international legal
framework for TNCs); Larissa van den Herik & Jernej Netmar Cernic, Regulating
Corporations Under International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal
Law and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 725 (2010) (exploring the idea of bringing
corporate human rights responsibility into an international criminal law paradigm to
remedy the existing enforcement gap); Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights
Law: Toward Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV.
183 (2010) (arguing for the creation of global human rights law, as distinct from
international human rights law, to be the law paradigm for TNCs); Cynthia Williams,
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 705 (2002) (arguing that a new paradigm needs to be created that incorporates
the reality of how corporations do business today).
17. Kinley & Junko Tadaki, supra note 16, at 934.
18. Id.
19. See discussion infra Section I.B. and accompanying footnotes.
20. These scenarios are based on, but not identical to, situations involving the
following corporations: Unocal, Union Carbide, and Bechtel. For brief summaries of
each (that also allude to strategies by TNCs that implicate a bystander strategy), see
Boston Common Asset Management, Indian Judge Orders Dow to Explain Shielding of
Subsidiary in Bhopal Criminal Case, CSR WIRE (Jan 11. 2005), http://www.csrwire.co
m/press_releases/20781-Indian-Judge-Orders-Dow-to-Explain-Shielding-of-Subsidiaryin-Bhopal-Criminal-Case (discussing Union Carbide’s Bhopal disaster and the
corporate responsibility issues involved); Andrew Gumbel, Tale of Rape and Murder
on Burmese Pipeline Haunts U.S., THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 11 2003),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/tale-of-rape-and-murder-on-burm
ese-pipeline-haunts-us-57624 8.html (discussing Unocal); Sheraz Sadiq, Timeline:
Cochabamba Water Revolt, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYS. (June 2002), http://www.pbs.
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framework under international law that imposes liability for TNCs in
these situations.
Finding a theory of liability to hold TNCs accountable under
international law is problematic. First, since many human rights
violations occur in weak or nonfunctioning governance systems,
attempts to use national laws to hold TNCs accountable for their role in
human rights abuses has been largely unworkable.21 Second, any attempt
to hold TNCs accountable at an international level is stymied by the
underlying framework of international human rights law (namely as an
accountability mechanism that was crafted by, and applied exclusively
to, state actors).22 Third, attempts to try a transnational approach to
accountability, while finding some limited success, are often barred by
jurisdictional issues.23 Fourth (and relatedly), the peculiar legal structure
of corporations, with their capacity to limit liability through subsidiaries,
provides a difficult, often insurmountable burden in trying to assess
what role these enterprises and their representatives have in the vast
number of human rights abuses that occur. Finally, TNCs often use
bystander rhetoric to distance themselves from underlying human rights
violations, placing the blame on the State or the community.24
Moreover, TNCs also employ other means of escaping liability
through their use of, what I have labeled, bystander rhetoric. Rarely do
TNCs disavow the existence of an event; rather, they take the position
that they are mere bystanders—witnesses to the underlying event that
have abstained from participation.25 This rhetoric is significant because,
under most legal theories, bystanders cannot be held liable for the acts in
question.26 Apart from the question of legal complicity, the rhetoric is
also significant because it shows an attempt to convey the idea of the
innocent bystander—an entity who, in essence, is often made to witness
(against its will) the struggle between the aggressor and his victim.27 By
org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html (documenting the water riots in Bolivia
and including statement by a Bechtel spokeswoman suggesting that “the political
instability in Bolivia, rather than people’s ire at water-rate hikes, was responsible for
the ‘civil unrest.’”).
21. Respect Framework, supra note 13.
22. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 2.
23. Respect Framework, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 88–89.
24. Martin Amerson, supra note 10.
25. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 5.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 5.

880

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

employing this rhetoric, both as a public relations strategy and a
litigation strategy, TNCs can escape liability under most national and
international systems.28
A. THE BYSTANDER RHETORIC
TNCs and their corporate structures carry unique characteristics
that make holding them liable difficult. First, TNCs are often
specifically organized in such a way as to avoid liability for events that
occur in different States.29 For instance, many TNCs, while
organizationally seamless, are separate legal entities.30 Therefore,
although a TNC may present one face to the global community, it is
usually a collection of distinct legal entities. Its subsidiaries (which may
be positioned on the ground during the abuses) are often organized
under the laws of a Host State,31 while reporting directly to the
executives of the parent corporation (domiciled in a different
jurisdiction). As such, TNCs (and particularly the organizing parent
corporation) are able to avoid liability for human rights abuses in the
parent corporation’s jurisdiction by emphasizing the separate legal status
of the entity in the Host State.32
Second, TNCs wield an unusually large amount of wealth and
power that oftentimes dwarfs the income and capacity of the Host
State.33 Therefore, Host States that are dependent on TNCs for economic
growth and development frequently turn the other way, or worse,
28.
29.

Id. at 34–44.
Mahmood Mashiouri, Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global
Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 974 (2003).
30. For an expansive analysis of the legal personalities of TNCs, including when
their separate legal personalities can be overcome, see Binda Sahni, The Interpretation
of the Corporate Personality of Transnational Corporations, 15 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2005).
31. Under international law, the Home State is the State where the TNC’s primary
headquarters are located. In contrast, the Host State is the locale of the operations that
lead to human rights abuses.
32. See Sahni, supra note 30, at 34 (2005). Sahni explores how current corporate
law allows a corporation to limit its own liability for its subsidiaries, whereby “[a
TNC’s] ability to limit its owner’s liability makes the undertaking of otherwise risky
projects more acceptable, thereby accelerating economic activity and development.” Id.
33. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 8 n.31; Mashiouri, supra note 29, at 973.
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become complicit in human rights abuses to ensure that the TNCs will
continue to remain.34
Third, TNCs often embrace bystander rhetoric in the wake of
human rights abuses. In essence, a TNC will claim that no overt act that
led to the human rights abuse can be directly linked back to the TNC. As
a result, the TNC will argue that it was merely a witness, a bystander to
the underlying acts that occurred. Corporate actors will frequently
acknowledge that there are human rights abuses occurring around them,
but will disclaim any and all involvement with the acts, frustrating
efforts to hold them accountable.
Despite the TNC’s rhetoric, many accountability mechanisms have
been proposed35 and attempted36 to address the unique position of TNCs.
By and large, these have focused on the actions of a TNC in relation to
an underlying event. For instance, most litigation that has been launched
against TNCs has attempted to ascribe some action to the TNC that led
to the human rights abuse in question.37 Nevertheless, TNCs uniformly
34. See Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb.
22, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/110/27/PD
F/G0611027.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter 2006 Interim Report].
[Yet a] third rationale for engaging the transnational corporate sector has emerged in
the past few years: the sheer fact that it has global reach and capacity, and that it is
capable of acting at a pace and scale that neither Governments nor international
agencies can match. Other social actors increasingly are looking for ways to leverage
this platform in order to cope with pressing societal problems - often because
Governments are unable or unwilling to perform their functions adequately.

Id. ¶ 16.
35. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubenstein, Accountability in an Unequal World, 69 J. POL.
616 (2007) (proposing a model of surrogate accountability for holding powerful actors
responsible on the international stage).
36. In the United States, the proposed mechanism of choice was the Alien Tort
Claims Act (“ATCA”). For a current view of the legal landscape surrounding ATCA,
see Janine Stansinz, Note, The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection in the
Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 5 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 573 (2011).
37. One example is Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C.
2008), a case brought by Indonesian villagers and their next of kin who alleged that
soldiers who were employed by Exxon to maintain order for their pipeline brutalized
and tortured the villagers. Another example is the case of Ken Wiwa, an activist
executed by the Nigerian government for making claims that it, along with Shell,
destroyed the environment and reaped profits. For an analysis of Shell’s involvement in
Wiwa’s trial, see Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 24-27.
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deny their involvement in such underlying events. Given the weak legal
framework for extraterritorial violations, plaintiffs who sue, particularly
in the United States, are not often successful.38
This is why the debate has often stalled: rather than focusing on
corporations as the responsible actors, current international law
mechanisms focus on the state as the actor, and corporations as mere
bystanders—but there is no legal framework that addresses the
complicity of such witnesses.39 Moreover, TNCs have taken advantage
38. See generally Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 23-31; see also Ronen
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 635, 655 (2004)
(“[TNC]s thus depict themselves as both lacking an ability to have an impact on
relevant policies and neutrally respectful of state policies in the countries where they
operate.”). Shamir uses the examples of Coca-Cola in Indonesia and Unocal in Burma.
Both corporations made defenses that they were too far removed from the situation to
have any influence over the human rights abuses that occurred. Id. at 650. Shamir also
analyzes the weaknesses of the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, as a mechanism to sue TNCs
for human rights abuses. Id. at 650-655. The defenses, combined with a weak doctrine,
makes litigation an uphill battle for plaintiffs. Id. at 659-660.
39. Id. at 32. Complicity theory is one legal tactic that seeks to avoid the
conundrum that exists when the alleged action is far removed from the prosecuted
actor. In one respect, complicity is an attractive alternative—unlike many other theories
of liability, it can be used with some underlying legal accountability mechanism in the
international arena. The key shortcoming for complicity under international law as it
stands now, is that it does not go far enough. For instance, the current consensus
regarding complicity and international law is that “mere presence where an abuse
occurs, or deriving incidental benefit from a relationship with one who commits an
abuse or even from the abuse itself, is unlikely to result in legal liability for
complicity.” See U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Bus. and Hum.
Rts., Letter dated Sept. 12, 2008 from the Special Representative to the Legal Officer of
Int’l Econ. Rel. of the Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www
.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-comments-ICJ-complicity-report-12-Sep-2008.pdf
(summarizing the current criminal framework for complicity).
While it bears many similarities to the idea of complicity, the bystander
concept is not the same. The standard for complicity that is widely accepted as the most
clear articulation of international law is found in a United States Court of Appeals case,
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). At its core, complicity behavior is
based, at least in part, on some overt act on the part of the actor that leads to
“substantial assistance.” Id. at 951. In contrast, bystander liability, rather than being
based on the actions of the TNC, is based on the relationship that the TNC has with the
host country. As a result, bystander liability is arguably most appropriate in situations
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of this legal structure by reinforcing, through their legal and nonlegal
strategies, the claim that they only witnessed but did not participate in
the underlying events.
Invoking a bystander strategy takes a new approach. Rather than
focusing on the conduct of TNCs, it accepts TNCs as mere bystanders,
using this rhetoric as a starting point for an accountability mechanism. A
key characteristic then of any accountability structure built around this
strategy marks a shift in focus from the actions of TNCs to the special
relationships that TNCs have created (particularly in weak governance
zones), and further, how those relationships may create special duties for
TNCs under international law.
Sometimes these duties have been recognized in the legal system,
albeit in extralegal ways (i.e., under principles of equity rather than
precedent). One example is Union Carbide’s involvement with an
explosion at a plant in Bhopal, India.
B. INDIA’S BHOPAL DISASTER
Union Carbide has had a long history of operating in India.40 On
December 2, 1984, its facility, located in Bhopal, India, had an accident
during which deadly gas emitted from the factory and out into the
community. While the figures vary regarding the number of deaths that
resulted, the most conservative estimates place the death toll at 400 from
that evening alone.41 In subsequent months, the death toll would rise to
15,000.42 Since then, due to the continuing contamination of the area, as
well as its groundwater and soil, illness and deaths relating to that
where the relationship is at issue because of the duties that arise from the recognition of
special relationships. See Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 12.
40.
Internat’l Confed. of Free Trade Unions & Internat’l Fed. of Chemical,
Energy, and General Workers Unions, The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission to Study
the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide
Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2nd/3rd 1984, BHOPAL.NET, http://www
.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/unionreport1985.html (last visited October 31,
2012).
41. There is also a wide range of estimates regarding the number of people who
died in the days after the disaster, however, by all accounts, the numbers multiplied
rapidly so that within the first seventy-two hours more than 1,200 were likely dead. The
Bhopal Disaster, CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, http://www.cseindia.org/us
erfiles/THE%20BHOPAL%20DISASTER.pdf.
42. Rallies Held over Bhopal Disaster, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2004), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4064527.stm.
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evening still occur.43 At the time of the accident, Union Carbide (now
owned by Dow Chemical) was the parent company of Union Carbide
India (“UCI”). The company had a 50.9% interest in UCI, sufficient to
exercise control over the subsidiary.44
Within a week of the accident, lawsuits were filed in the U.S.
against Union Carbide, the parent corporation. The company defended
on the grounds of forum non conveniens.45 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, which had consolidated all of the
suits into one lawsuit and one jurisdiction, agreed to dismiss the suit
against Union Carbide if the company would consent to jurisdiction in
India.46 Once the suit was removed to India, the litigation continued. In
1989, the company made a settlement offer of $470M.47 The Indian
Supreme Court subsequently approved the settlement amount.48
Although Union Carbide argued that it should not be held
responsible because it did not have control over the actions of its
subsidiary, the Indian Supreme Court soundly rejected this principle.
The Court held that because Union Carbide was the majority
shareholder in its Indian subsidiary, it had the power to exercise “full
control” over UCI and its board.49 Even if it did not exercise that power,
as Union Carbide alleged, that policy “could not absolve it from its
liability.”50 In this ruling the court, although not explicitly, turned the
bystander strategy invoked by Union Carbide on its head and found that

43.
44.

Id.
Under Indian law, foreign direct investment is normally limited to 40%.
Practising Law Institute, 765 Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
International Joint Ventures 141, 155 (Mar. 1998). However, Union Carbide was
granted an exemption. Gas Leak Shatter Reputation, LAWRENCE-JOURNAL WORLD
(Dec. 16. 1984) available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=219&dat=198412
16&id=83EzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DOkFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4436,3913765.
45. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India in December,
1984, 634 F.Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
46. Id. at 867.
47. Union Carbide v. Union of India et. al., (2/14/1989) (Supreme Court of India),
available at http://judis.nic.in.
48. Id.
49. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 195-196 (4th ed.).
50. Id.
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the sheer nature of the accident, along with principles of equity, made
the company liable (if not solely liable) for the disaster.51
This case highlights the use of bystander rhetoric well. Union
Carbide’s seemingly attenuated legal status from its subsidiary led the
corporation to argue that it should not be held accountable for the
disaster at Bhopal. The company could not (and did not) deny that the
accident occurred; rather, it simply stated that its legal status as a U.S.
corporation made it, in essence, a distant bystander to the event that
occurred half a world away.
C. IMPLEMENTING A BYSTANDER THEORY
As of right now, the bystander strategy is in its formative stages.
Although unusual in case law, the idea of holding a party responsible for
their inaction is not without precedent.52 For instance, in certain limited
situations in American tort law, nonfeasance can result in legal
accountability and legal liability. In those situations, the relationship
between the bystander and the victim creates a special duty which can
then lead to liability for the duty bearer’s inaction.53 Likewise, a
contemplated bystander analysis for legal liability under international
law might begin by analyzing relationships under this type of
framework—one that will allow relationships to give rise to a duty that
in turn forms the foundation for a theory of accountability.54 To do
51. Union Carbide v. Union of India (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) No. 26/88 (1988),
reprinted in VAGTS ET AL., supra note 49.
52. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Kim Boyer,
Comment, County Welfare Department Liability for Handling Reports of Child Abuse,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 187, 190–191 (1993).
53. The case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), provides a
discussion of a special relationship and how a special relationship (in this case between
the State and the victim) can create a duty to act. In DeShaney, a young boy was beaten
extensively by his father over the course of many years. Id. at 192. During that time, the
State had substantial evidence that abuse was occurring and yet did not step in to stop it.
Id. at 192–93. As a result of the beatings, DeShaney suffered extensive brain damage.
Id. at 193. In a 6-3 ruling, the Court held that the State had no duty to act. Id. at 200–02.
However, the court noted that in certain instances, where a special relationship is
created, it may give rise to a constitutional duty to act. Id. at 201–02. The Court also
discussed whether a duty may be created under state tort law. Id.
54. In American case law, it is the relationship between the bystander and the
victim that creates the duty to act. For an overview of the case law on the subject, see
Boyer, supra note 52, at 190–91. Given that TNCs are often present in weak
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otherwise would make the parameters of inaction too large and unwieldy
for a serious structure of accountability.
The bystander framework, as articulated, also has room for
flexibility. The American theory of nonfeasance happens to be one of
the most promising areas where the bystander theory can grow, but there
are many different jurisprudential theories that can be used to craft a
workable framework for TNCs under international law. Unjust
enrichment,55 which has traditionally been categorized under theories of
contract but is much more accurately a theory of equity, is another.
Moreover, an additional theory of accountability may stem from a
theory of products liability. Under a products liability theory, a
corporation assumes liability for the status of its product regardless of its
final market.56 So, for instance, a Taiwanese manufacturer can still face
liability if it improperly manufactures a fire extinguisher that results in
deaths and injuries in California. One can ask why the same result
should not occur in a human rights framework. As one author notes: “If
companies legally assume responsibility for the quality of their products
regardless of where they are manufactured, should they not also bear
some responsibility for the manner and conditions in which they are
produced?”57 All of these theories are an attempt to solve the problem
that has occurred as a result of the rapidly evolving role of business
within the world.
In his 2008 Report, Ruggie argues that the single greatest challenge
to crafting a business and human rights regime stems from the rise of
governance zones, an appropriate accountability theory for business and human rights
violations might focus on the relationship between the TNC and the aggressor, in lieu of
or in addition to, the relationship between the TNC and the victim.
55. M.C.D., Annotation, Nontort Liability of Third Person Who Receives Money or
Property in Supposed Performance of Contract, to Party to Contract Who Was Entitled
Thereto, 106 A.L.R. 322 (1937).
56. For a geographically close example, see In re Ephedra Products Liability
Litigation, 349 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (addressing enforcement of a
Canadian court’s bankruptcy order for a Canadian company’s involvement in marketing
ephedra).
57. Justine Nolan, Global Scourge of Corporate Buck-Passing on Workers’ Rights,
NATIONAL TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/
global-scourge-of-corporate-buckpassing-on-workers-rights-20100609-xwl9.html#ixz
z1TEOTnOVy.
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globalization.58 Specifically, Ruggie argues that globalization, and with
it the rise of TNCs that are subject to the laws of many jurisdictions, has
created a governance gap that international law has not yet filled.59 I
agree with Ruggie’s assessment and suggest further that this gap is
precisely the area in which the bystander framework applies.
The bystander framework offers a mechanism whereby companies
must take proactive steps to make sure that the relationships they are
developing do not lead to violations of human rights law or ignore the
consequences of those relationships at their peril.60
II. OUT OF THE FIERY FURNACE: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE U.N. STAGE
The issue of business and human rights has been on the
international legal terrain for less than two decades.61 Its genesis came
58.
59.

Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 3.
The Respect Framework states that the governance gap can affect all
corporations. Id. ¶ 17. However, it specifically uses TNCs as an example of the
governance gap. Id. ¶ 3.
60. Indeed, this idea is a looming specter for many TNCs. See Memorandum
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on A U.N. Proposal Defining Corp. Soc. Resp. for
Hum. Rts. (May 1, 2008), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/
wachtell_lipton_memo_on_global_business_human_rights.pdf (stating that Ruggie’s
proposed framework would “impose on corporations the obligation to compensate for
the political, civil, economic, social or other deficiencies of the countries in which they
do business.”).
61. It is always difficult to set specific, temporal parameters when a movement
emerges or becomes part of the national or international discourse. The issue of
business and human rights is no exception. At least one source has identified the
evolution as spanning three distinct phases. In the first phase, 1998–2002, mainly
European and North American NGOs were pushing companies on their policies. The
second phase, 2003–2006, was also led in North America and Europe, but shifted its
focus to the conduct and impacts of corporations. The third phase, 2007-present, has
emerged as a global debate that focuses mainly on “conduct on the ground.” Business &
Human Rights, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.businesshumanrights.org/GettingStartedPortal/Intro (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). In contrast, at
least one author traces the U.N.’s involvement in corporate accountability issues (if not
specifically human rights issues) much further back. Connie De La Vega, Amol Mehra,
& Alexander Wong, Holding Businesses Accountable for Human Rights Violations:
Recent Developments and Next Steps, Dialogue on Globalization, 2 (July 2011),
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08264.pdf (tracing the issue to 1972 when the U.N.
Economic and Social Council commissioned a study on “the role of transnational
corporations and their impact on the development process as well as on international
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from a grassroots strategy developed by human rights advocates who
were growing frustrated by the lack of accountability measures for
TNCs and other multi-business enterprises. The popular sentiment was
that TNCs seemed to be involved in or witness to many of the human
rights disasters that were taking shape. Yet, by and large, there was no
redress available—TNCs seemed to conduct their business with
impunity.
Since that time, the issue of business and human rights has begun to
attract an enormous amount of attention.62 However, as mentioned
earlier, finding a theory of liability to hold TNCs accountable under
international law has been met with a myriad of problems. In addition,
many TNCs employ the strategy of distancing themselves from
underlying human rights violations, instead placing blame on the State
or the community. For a long time, this was an effective legal strategy.63
Nevertheless, TNCs did not escape exposure completely. In the court of
public opinion, TNCs were losing.64 Realizing that the use of legal
relations.”). Nevertheless, a case study of one human rights organization’s publicity
campaign shows the evolution. A survey of all Human Rights Watch press releases in
the 1990s shows that the first press release explicitly discussing TNCs in connection
with human rights campaigns occurred on Dec. 28, 1998. International Corporations
Violate Women’s Rights in Mexico, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 29, 1998,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/12/28/international-corporations-violate-womens-ri
ghts-mexico. From 1998–2011, there is a slow but steady increase in press releases
linking TNCs to human rights issues. See infra Appendix B.
62. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34.
There being no global repository of comprehensive, consistent, and impartial
information, we cannot say with certainty whether abuses in relation to the corporate
sector are increasing or decreasing over time, only that they are reported more
extensively because more actors track them and transparency is greater than in the
past. Of course, to victims of abuses this uncertainty matters little. But it does make it
more difficult to design and assess the efficacy of alternative policy approaches to
deal with these challenges – a bit like searching for ways to prevent and cure cancer
without fully knowing its epidemiology.

Id. ¶ 20.
63. Martin Amerson, supra note 10.
64. Cf. Respect Framework, supra note 13, at ¶ 54 (discussing the effect of
companies who fail to take responsibility for human rights issues in the “courts of
public opinion”). In addition, although at the time of this writing TNCs have not yet
been subject to an unfavorable verdict for international human rights claims (i.e., under
ATCA), there are nonetheless costs in litigating and even settling these issues. See
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instruments was ineffective, many human rights advocates switched to
publicity campaigns (frequently called “naming and shaming”) to
highlight human rights abuses and force TNCs to change their
behavior.65
Businesses’ initial resistance to such strategies—and indeed the
wider agenda of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)—seems to have
stemmed from the notion that corporations viewed business and human
rights as a zero-sum game. Every move that a corporation made in the
arena of a social cause was thought to take away from the raison d’être
of a corporation—profit maximization.66 Indeed, noted business author
Steve Forbes expressed his views on the CSR movement in this way:
Under the label of Corporate Social Responsibility, firms are to take
on a non-wealth-producing agenda of goals; profits will be lowered
to safeguard labor rights, human health, civil liberties, environmental
quality, sexual equality, and social justice. The fact that the
corporation already plays its most effective role in these areas by
profit maximization is little understood by CSR advocates.67

Moreover, whether public relations and advocacy strategies were
successful on a micro level seems impossible to prove. While some
campaigns resulted in changed behavior,68 many did not. For instance, a
David Kinley et al., The Norms as Dead! Long Live the Norms! The Politics behind the
United Nations Norms for Corporations, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 468 (2007).
65. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008) (examining specifically,
statistics regarding governments as perpetrators, but the term can be applied to any
human rights violator); Deborah Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How
Multinationals Export Human Rights, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar-Apr. 1998 (using the
term “the spotlight phenomenon” in an examination of how corporations change their
behavior when there is a heightened public awareness of human rights).
66. See Steve Forbes, Foreward as cited in DAVID HENDERSON, THE ROLE OF
BUSINESS IN THE MODERN WORLD: PROGRESS, PRESSURES, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE
MODERN ECONOMY ( 2004), available at http://cei.org/sites/default/files/David%20H
enderson%20%20The%20Role%20of%20Business%20in%20the%20Modern%20Worl
d%20Progress,%20Pressures%20and%20Prospects%20for%20the%20Market%20Econ
omy.pdf.
67. See id. at 10.
68. Tim Bartley & Curtis Child, Shaming the Corporation: Globalization,
Reputation and the Dynamics of Anti-Corporate Movements, http://www.indiana.edu/~
tbsoc/SM-corps-sub.pdf (arguing that publicly linking actors to systematic problems is
an important part of social movements).
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TNC could take advantage of a dwindling global attention span by
simply waiting for a new corporate scandal to emerge, rather than taking
steps to change their behavior.69 At the very least, the work of human
rights advocates did find success in bringing TNCs’ behavior during
human rights calamities into public discourse70 and, in doing so, set the
stage for the U.N. Global Compact and its success.
A. The U.N. Global Compact
The U.N. Global Compact (the “Global Compact” or “Compact”)
was launched in 2000 as a voluntary initiative to get businesses to
engage in a wide-ranging societal agenda.71 At its heart, the Compact
encourages businesses to pledge to honor ten principles that surround
human rights issues.72 In return, the Compact allows businesses to
become signatories. In the first year of its existence, the Compact had
fifty signatories. As of this writing, the Compact has over 6,000.73
The Compact came out of a challenge that Kofi Annan made to
world business leaders during a speech at the World Economic Forum
on January 31, 1999.74 At the time, the proposal was called “unusual”
because it involved a formal compact between the United Nations and

69.
70.
71.

Id. at 23.
Bartley & Child, supra note 68.
About Us, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unGlobalcomp
act.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT].
72. Unlike many of the initiatives that came after this, the Global Compact
originally began as an initiative from then Secretary-General Kofi-Annan. During an
economic meeting in Switzerland, Kofi Annan gave a speech in which he discussed a
global compact between the U.N. and businesses that would encourage businesses to
infuse their companies with the values of human rights norms. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
73. Participants & Stakeholders: U.N. Global Compact Participants, THE UNITED
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeho
lders/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
74. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Address to World Economic Forum in
Davos (Feb. 1, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_
search_full.asp?statID=22 [hereinafter Address in Davos].
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business entities.75 Moreover, the Compact allows its signatories to
shroud themselves in the legitimacy of the United Nations.76
Annan emphasized that the Compact would be voluntary but
warned of a backlash against the global markets if businesses did not
take more proactive steps to ensure that they were addressing human
rights abuses within their sphere of influence.77 In Annan’s words, the
aim of the Compact was to “ensure that the global market is embedded
in broadly shared values and practices which reflect global social needs,
and that all the world’s people share the benefits of globalization.”78 As
part of the Compact, business leaders agreed to do three things: (1)
become public voices of the Compact by embedding the principles of
the Compact into the company’s organizational structure (such as its
mission statements and annual reports); (2) annually report on the
company’s progress (or lack thereof) “of putting the principles into
practice;”79 and (3) engage in partnership projects with the U.N. on both
an operational and a policy level.80
The Global Compact marked a strategic shift by the United
Nations. Only a few years prior, the organization’s position was strongly
against transnational firms, drafting summaries that documented their
abuses.81 Its prior position reflected a deep suspicion that TNCs had
75. Alan Cowell, Annan Fears Backlash over Global Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 1,
1999, at A14.
76. Specifically, companies who signed onto the Compact would have limited use
of the U.N.’s logo in their corporate materials.
77. Cowell, supra note 75. While Annan presented the initiative as one that would
benefit businesses, there is some indication that the Compact also benefited the United
Nations. Some have noted that Annan’s term as the head of the United Nations marked
a move away from irrelevance that had been plaguing the organization in previous
years. See Callie Kramer, Kofi Annan and the United Nations win the 2001 Nobel
Peace Prize, 18 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 475 (2002) (noting that “Kofi Annan was also
lauded for . . . revitalizing the 56 year-old United Nations.”). Cf. Joseph Kahn,
Multinational Sign Pact on Rights and Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/27/world/multinationals-sign-un-pact-on-rights-andenvironment.html?pagewanted=all (stating that the Global Compact “is an attempt by
Mr. Annan to make the world body a more effective force for labor and social
standards”).
78. Kofi Annan, A Deal with Business to Support Universal Values, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., July 26, 2000, at 8.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Editorial, Taming Globalization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2000, at A20
[hereinafter Taming Globalization].
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nothing positive to offer the world’s communities. In contrast, Annan’s
speech marked a new consensus view in the organization that
globalization was “the only remotely viable means of pulling billions of
people out of the abject poverty in which they find themselves.”82 TNCs
became recognized as pioneering the shift toward globalization, taking
part in the solution, not just the problem.83
Interestingly, Ruggie was one of the main architects and strong
defenders of the Global Compact.84 As U.N. Assistant Secretary-General
from 1997 to 2001, Ruggie responded to critics who believed that the
Global Compact would simply provide companies with an easy
whitewash of their image. Specifically, Ruggie stated:
You quote critics who assert that the secretary general’s “global
compact,” designed to identify and promote good corporate practices
in human rights, labor standards and the environment, opens the
United Nations’ doors to big business. These critics ignore the fact
that the Compact is an equal partnership among business,
international labor and global nongovernmental organizations. The
82.
83.

Id. (quoting an unnamed agency representative).
Many argue that the evolution of globalization has its roots in the post-Cold
War world. Businesses, freed from the dominant political stratification between the East
and the West, were able to tap into emerging markets in a way that previously would
have been impossible. In fact, one author credits the end of the Cold War with the shift
in focus towards advocacy of multinationals. Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a
Globalized Era, N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 18, 2000, at C19. In a discussion of the human rights
advocacy strategy that emerged in the late 1990s with DeBeers and its mining of
conflict diamonds, Cowell wrote:
The campaign and its fruits, though, go beyond diamonds, because they reinforce one
of the most striking effects of the globalization that has been under way since the end
of the cold war. Increasingly, with multinational corporations gathering unparalleled
power as the standard-bearers of freewheeling capitalism—in many countries, more
powerful than the governments themselves—they are being held to account by
shoestring advocacy groups like Global Witness that have filled the vacuum created
by the end of the ideological contest between East and West, between capitalism and
socialism.

Id.
84. Robert A. Senser, Big Business and the U.N.; Toward a New Framework
Corporate Responsibility, AM. CATH. WKLY., Dec. 1, 2008, available
http://www.americanmagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11253. Much
Ruggie’s later work as Special Rapporteur seems to be influenced by his work on
Global Compact.
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United Nations has guidelines for dealing with business; they were
adopted in July.
You report that one critic suggested that the inclusion in the global
compact of companies that may have had spotty records in the past
sends the wrong signal. The implication is that the United Nations
should strive to improve the performance only of the perfect. Doing
so would make life easier, but what would be the point?85

Although the Compact was praised in some sectors86 and seen as an
important step forward in bringing businesses into the conversation
regarding human rights,87 its shortcomings flowed alongside its
popularity among businesses. Because it was voluntary, there were no
consequences for deviating from these principles apart from the public
disapprobation stirred by human rights advocates’ various shaming
campaigns, which many regarded as ineffective.88
Many international human rights groups, including groups who
participated in the first Compact meeting, felt that self-regulation by
85. John Ruggie, Letter to the Editor, Re ‘Globalization Tops 3-Day U.N. Agenda
for World Leaders’ (front page, Sept. 3), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000, at A30. Ruggie’s
initial position prior to becoming the Special Representative may have been one reason
why people criticized him for his subsequent work on the Framework.
86. Victoria Brittain, Business Rallies to U.N. Ethics Scheme, THE GUARDIAN, July
26, 2000, at 12; Maria Livanos Cattaui, Yes to Annan’s ‘Global Compact’ if It Isn’t a
License to Meddle, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 26, 2000, at 8; Mark Moody-Stuart
Welcomes the New Global Compact Between the U.N. and Business, ECONOMIC NEWS,
July 27, 2000; Marketplace: Making Corporations Good, Global Citizens, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO, Sept. 6, 2000; Michael Oliver, Global Governance and Civil Society, PEACE
MAG., January 2000, at v.16(1).
87. Of course, the Compact also had its critics right from the beginning. See, e.g.,
Joshua Karliner & Kenny Bruno, Opinion, The United Nations Sits in Suspicious
Company, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 6, 2000, at 6 (stating that the self-regulation
process of the Global Compact “threatens the integrity of the U.N.”). For a middle
ground response, see Taming Globalization, supra note 81 (stating that while the
Global Compact allowed corporations to have “cheap halos,” the author concludes that
“the idea of partnering with the private sector beats merely denouncing it”).
88. Other initiatives that were used during this era include: The Sullivan Principles
(voluntary codes of conduct adopted by businesses on issues that affect broader society)
and the OECD and its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (State recommendations
to businesses regarding standards of conduct). While these initiatives have some
relevance to the international legal framework on business and human rights (not least
of which is the offering of a soft law foundation for future accountability mechanisms),
this Article focuses on various mandates that have come from the United Nations within
the last eight years.

894

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

businesses under the Compact was insufficient. Pierre Sane, then
Secretary General of Amnesty International, stated that in order for the
Compact to be “‘effective and credible’ there must be publicly reported
independent monitoring and enforcement via a sanctions system ‘so
companies who are violating these principles cannot continue to benefit
from the partnership.’”89
In reality, there is little wonder that human rights advocates would
seem frustrated by the Compact, given some of its vague and amorphous
language. There are ten90 principles that are at the heart of the Global
Compact, each involving how businesses engage in a wider social
agenda within four specific spheres: human rights, labor, environmental
impact, and corruption.91 Only two of the ten principles explicitly fall
under the rubric of human rights: “(1) Businesses should support and
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and
(2) make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”92
Although many of the other principles are stated as labor issues, they in
fact fall under the larger umbrella of human rights concerns.93 Indeed,
on its face, the ambiguous nature of the Global Compact seems to leave
little hope of developing a consistent framework for operationalizing94
its principles.95
89.
90.

Karliner & Bruno, supra note 87.
The Global Compact, as originally conceived, had nine principles. The tenth
(dealing with anticorruption issues) was added in 2004 during the first Global Summit
on the Compact.
91. About Us: The Ten Principles, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Ten Principles].
92. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 71.
93. See Ten Principles, supra note 91, (Principles 3–6: Labour).
94. In interviews regarding his mandate, Ruggie uses the term “operationalize” to
describe what he was attempting to do with the Guiding Principles. As used by Ruggie,
operationalization is the process by which theories and legal doctrines are turned into a
workable Framework of policies and assessments that can then be implemented by
various actors. For consistency, I adopt that term here.
95. In the wake of these criticisms, the Global Compact office created a Report
entitled “After the Signature: A Guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global
Compact.” UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, AFTER THE SIGNATURE: A GUIDE TO
ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (JAN. 2012), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/after_the_signature.pdf
[hereinafter AFTER THE SIGNATURE].
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Nevertheless, although the Compact’s foundational principles
remain vague, the Global Compact office (set up in the wake of the
program’s initiation) has taken steps to elaborate on some of these
issues. For instance, one of the most significant developments made by
the Global Compact is the introduction of the notion of sphere(s) of
influence. The Compact defines sphere of influence as follows:
Companies are asked to embrace, support and enact the ten
principles within their “sphere of influence.” Perhaps the term is
better described as spheres of influence, and envisioned as a series of
concentric circles, where influence diminishes as the circles get
bigger. The smallest circle includes a company’s core business
activities in the workplace and marketplace. This is where a
company has the greatest control in affecting ESG (environmental,
social and governance) performance. The next circle covers the
supply chain. Control is weakened here, but in some cases the
influence can be significant. The third circle includes a company’s
community interaction, social investment and philanthropy activities.
And the final circle of influence is a company’s engagement in
public policy dialogue and advocacy activities.96

Through this type of elaboration of the concepts embodied in its
principles, the Global Compact attempts to push TNCs towards a greater
realization of human rights. Unfortunately, an outside mechanism or
review to track whether the Compact’s goals are being achieved is still
lacking. Thus, a company can set up its own guidelines that might fall
into the amorphous category of “respecting human rights” without
actually engaging in the Compact the way the Global Compact Office
suggests. Therefore, notwithstanding this failure to achieve the
Compact’s goals, such businesses can conceivably continue to benefit
from the imprimatur of the U.N. logo.
Some scholars contend that the Compact is presently a soft law
mechanism that may give rise to a more tangible accountability
framework in the future. As Erika George states, “International law must
come to [recognize] that there are multiple and heterogeneous sources of
authority in pluralistic systems. . . . We should consider whether
corporations are making law in making pledges. Is the Global Compact

Rather than relying on vague, amorphous language, Ruggie’s framework and
Guiding Principles examine the issue of business and human rights with clear policy
goals and operational steps to actualizing those goals.
96. Id. at 11.
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a contract?”97 The Compact itself seeks to discourage the notion that it
can be used as an accountability mechanism (either through breach of
contract or otherwise). Indeed, the Compact was never intended as an
operational framework; instead, the Compact’s follow-up literature
makes clear that it is not a monitoring mechanism or even a standard of
conduct.98
As a result, the Global Compact (with its voluntary initiatives and
unenforceable mechanisms) led many human rights advocates to the
conclusion that what was really needed was an international legal
instrument that would hold TNCs accountable.99

97. Erika George, The Place of the Private Transnational Actor in International
Law: Human Rights Norms, Development Aims and Understanding Corporate SelfRegulation as Soft Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 28 (2007). George contends that
because the statements contained in the Global Compact are policy statements that are
adopted by what she views as legitimate authority, the Global Compact can make the
way towards future binding frameworks. Id.
98. AFTER THE SIGNATURE, supra note 95, at 7.
99. In their nascent stage, business and human rights issues appeared to be framed
largely within the context of the corporate social responsibility debate, perhaps because
an appropriate alternative dialogue on the issue of accountability mechanisms was
lacking. In fact, at least in nonlegal academia, much of the literature written on
corporate social responsibility before the 1990s framed it as a moral or ethical issue,
rarely as implicating fundamental human rights. For a survey on this literature, see Sita
C. Amba-Rao, Multinational Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics, Interactions and
Third World Governments: An Agenda for the 1990s, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS, no. 7, at 553–
572 (1993).
Now, however, it seems that the conversations have diverged. Therefore, each
dialogue—that surrounding general corporate social responsibility issues and that
involving business and human rights—should encompass its own sphere of scholarship.
As Chris Avery, Director of the Business and Human Rights Centre, notes,
“[s]ometimes the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) and
human rights is not properly understood.” Avery elaborates: “A CSR approach tends to
be top-down: a company decides what issues it wishes to address. . . . [b]ut a human
rights approach is different. It is not top-down, but bottom-up—with the individual at
the centre, not the corporation.” Chris Avery, Guest Editorial, The Difference Between
CSR and Human Rights, CORP. CITIZENSHIP BRIEFING, Issue 89, Aug./Sept. 2006,
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Avery-difference-between-CSR-andhuman-rights-Aug-Sep-2006.pdf.
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B. THE U.N. NORMS
The U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Entities (“the Norms”)100 was one of
the earliest documents to explicitly state that TNCs could be held liable
under international law for human rights abuses.101 Drafted by the U.N.
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
(“Sub-Commission”) and drawing on numerous human rights treaties,

100. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm., 55th Sess., Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Norms].
There is some debate in the academic community regarding whether previous treaties
have implicitly drawn an accountability framework. For instance, the Norms
themselves point to numerous treaties as the source of their authority. See discussion
infra Part II.B.2. While certain treaties that bind TNCs deal with specific aspects of
human rights (i.e., slavery and genocide), I am unaware of any other U.N. document
that explicitly takes this approach towards human rights issues globally. As one author
notes, the primary obstacle to the world community accepting that TNCs have a duty
under international law to protect against human rights violations, “seems to be the fact
that the U.N. human rights treaties are instruments of international law that bind
ratifying States rather than non-State actors.” SILVIA DANAILOV, THE ACCOUNTABILITY
OF NON-STATE ACTORS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE SPECIAL CASE OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 33 (Geneva 1998), available at http://www.lawand
development.org/docs/transnationalcorps.pdf.
101. In his June 2009 Report to the Council, Ruggie states that the Human Rights
Council’s endorsement of the Respect Framework “marked the first time the Council or
its predecessor had taken a substantive policy position on business and human rights.”
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards
Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www2.o
hchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf [hereinafter 2009
Report]. Notably, this issue came up more broadly in the 1970s, in the wake of a
scandal involving ITT’s alleged involvement in the overthrow of the Chilean
government. In response, the U.N. created a commission to develop a code of conduct
for TNCs. The code was formulated but never adopted by the United Nations and was
finally abandoned in 1992. While the document marked the first attempt to discuss
TNC conduct in relation to human rights, it was not substantive in scope. Chris
Jochnick & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN
Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413, 415
(2010). In addition, although the Sub-Commission did work on the Norms, they
remained at this level and the then Commission on Human Rights never adopted them.
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the Norms purportedly restated the guiding norms and principles at that
time for holding TNCs accountable.102
1. Textual Analysis
The Norms embody the first attempt by the U.N. to set forth
accountability mechanisms for TNCs under international human rights
law.103 In addition, although they discuss the State’s duty to protect, the
focus of responsibility is laid squarely at the feet of TNCs. In order to
secure their influence,104 the Norms reference approximately thirty
transnational instruments as the sources from which they derive their
authority for TNCs and human rights issues.105 In one sense, the Norms
102. Norms, supra note100, Preamble. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 901 (2003), at 901.
103. See Norms, supra note 100, for a more thorough discussion of the history of
TNCs and human rights under international law.
104. Because the Norms were not “an international treaty open to ratification by
States,” they would not be “legally binding” on either States or TNCs. Nevertheless, as
a purported restatement of the law regarding TNCs and human rights abuses, if adopted,
the Norms could have been a powerful accountability tool for human rights advocates
and victims of human rights abuses. INT’L NETWORK ON FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL
RTS., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS FOR BUSINESS: BRIEFING KIT 4 (Jan. 2005),
available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Briefing_Kit.pdf; see also discussion infra
note 136 and accompanying text.
105. Among the diverse set of instruments referenced are the International Code of
Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (adopted by the World Health Assembly) and the
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Norms, supra note 100,
¶ 2. There are a significant number of human rights treaties that can impact the
intersection of business and human rights. In fact, one of Ruggie’s main contentions in
drafting the Norms was that all human rights can be impacted and influenced by
corporate activities. In fact, one of the goals of the U.N. Norms was to analyze all the
“relevant” human rights treaties and decide which ones in particular would be within
the sphere of influence for corporations. Ruggie’s work was in direct opposition to this
approach. Instead, the Guiding Principles start from the premise that the “corporate
responsibility to respect human rights applies to all internationally recognized human
rights because business enterprises can have an impact – directly or indirectly – on
virtually the entire spectrum of these rights.” U.N. HUMAN RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AN
INTERPRETIVE GUIDE 13 (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/DocumentsPublicat
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draw on their precedent documents, particularly the U.N. Global
Compact. For instance, the Norms’ statement “noting that transnational
corporations and other business enterprises have the capacity to foster
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and
wealth,” appear to echo Kofi Annan’s remarks that globalization
through shared values between business and society can lead to an age
of “global prosperity.”106
At the core, however, the thrust of the Norms is to specifically
devise a mechanism that holds TNCs accountable under international
law for human rights violations.107 In that sense, the Norms are specific.
While the Norms require TNCs to respect cultural and social rights
generally,108 they focus mainly on issues that overtly implicate TNCs—
namely their role in targeted human rights abuses including workers’
rights, workplace discrimination, and consumer protection.109
In addition to the specific subject matter that the Norms address,
they also include two particularly controversial aspects: (1) the mandate
for TNCs to implement the principles embodied in the Norms; and (2) a
U.N. monitoring body to review the “application of the Norms.”110
These provisions may reflect an attempt by the Sub-Commission to
address critics’ concerns, whereas two of the strongest criticisms of the

ions/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf.
106. Address in Davos, supra note 74.
107. Indeed, one of Ruggie’s chief objections to the Norms is his claim that, while
purporting to be a restatement of the law, they invoked a binding accountability
framework for TNCs. See discussion infra at footnote 134 and accompanying text.
108. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 10.
109. Id. ¶¶ 3–8.
110. Id. ¶ 16. Putting aside the spirit of the monitoring process, the language in the
Norms regarding monitoring is problematic. What exactly should the U.N. monitor?
How should TNCs apply the Norms to their internal mechanisms? How should
particular Norms apply, at any given period in time, to a TNC? The Norms are silent as
to these questions. Likewise, the Norms Commentary sheds no light on this subject.
Rather, the Commentary simply states that the Council should “receive information and
take effective action when enterprises fail to comply with the Norms.” Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., Subcomm’n, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, ¶ 16(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/2
93378ff2003ceb0c1256d7900310d90/$FILE/G0316018.pdf
[hereinafter
Norms
Commentary].
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Global Compact were that it lacked an implementation procedure and a
monitoring body.111
In the Commentary accompanying the Norms, the Sub-Commission
outlines a six-step process for making sure that TNCs implement these
rules. They include:
1) distributing their internal operational rules to all relevant
stakeholders (including employees, trade unions,
contractors, subcontractors and suppliers);
2) providing training on the rules and how to implement them;
3) only working with contractors who follow the Norms;
4) increasing transparency “by disclosing timely, relevant,
regular and reliable information regarding their activities,
structure, financial situation and performance;”
5) informing affected communities about its activities; and
6) continually working on improving the Norms.112
These implementation procedures place a heavy burden on TNCs to
demonstrate how their activities either benefit or harm groups and
communities in the area of human rights. Further, a TNC would need to
integrate human rights issues into all aspects of its operations in order
for an implementation program to be successful, rather than simply
relegating the subject to its corporate social responsibility department.
Moreover, the Norms took a bold step forward from previous U.N.
documents by finding that an independent body should monitor and
enforce TNCs’ implementation of these rules.113 In fact, the
Commentary expands on this notion by arguing that a large and varied
group of stakeholders should participate in the monitoring efforts. They
111. KENNY BRUNO & JOSHUA KARLINER, TANGLED UP IN BLUE: CORPORATE
PARTNERSHIPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 7–9 (Transnat’l Res. & Action Ctr. Sept. 2000),
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf; Global
Policy Forum Europe, Speaking Notes, Whose Partnership for Whose Development?
Corporate Accountability in the U.N. System Beyond the Global Compact, 2 (July 4,
2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/17222782/20070704-Global-Compac
t-Alternative-Hearing-2007.
112. Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 15.
113. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 16.
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included: the full U.N. Commission on Human Rights (the
“Commission” or the “Council”), the Sub-Commission, NGOs, labor
unions, individuals and others.114 Specifically, NGOs, labor unions, and
other individuals submit information to either the Council or SubCommission. In turn, the two U.N. bodies, after receiving feedback from
a TNC, could use the information received as a means to take “effective
action” against the corporation.
Finally, the Norms co-opt the term “sphere of influence” from the
voluntary Global Compact, applying and expanding it to a mandatory
accountability mechanism for TNCs. Specifically, the Norms state that
within their “respective spheres of activity and influence,” TNCs must
respect and promote human rights.115 While never specifically defining
the term, the Commentary offers an explanatory note on the idea by
stating that TNCs’ obligations under the Norms apply “equally to
activities occurring in the home country or territory . . . and in any
country in which the business is engaged in activities.”116 It seems,
therefore, that the use of the term shifted from the Global Compact
(using “influence” to reference a TNC’s operational control) to a wider
understanding that included both operational and spatial control.117
Therefore, the Sub-Commission’s work took a decisive step towards
bringing an international accountability structure to bear on TNCs.
Unfortunately, in the wake of the Norms’ eventual defeat, that agenda
was left in a state of flux.
2. The Backlash
Specifically, there was a considerable amount of discord over how
various camps at the U.N. viewed the Norms. Although the Commission
eventually turned down the Norms in 2003, the Sub-Commission had
114.
115.
116.
117.

Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 16(b).
Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 1.
Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 1(a).
Id. ¶¶ 1(a)–(b) (discussing both the geographical and operational influences
that TNCs exert, stating that TNCs should “inform themselves of the human rights
impact of their principal activities and major proposed activities so that they can further
avoid complicity in human rights abuses). This language is particularly significant for
the bystander paradigm, suggesting that while a TNC’s actions may not directly cause a
human rights abuse, the TNC’s presence (and corresponding influence) can contribute
to it. See discussion infra Part III.C for a more extensive analysis of this language’s
application to a bystander framework.
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unanimously adopted them previously.118 Unlike the U.N.’s previous
effort to address business and human rights issues (largely through the
Global Compact), the Norms were a top-down, mandatory framework
that would hold TNCs liable under international law for failing to
respect human rights. Moreover, the Norms seemed to reflect the
growing frustration held by many in the international community
regarding the lack of accountability mechanisms for TNCs.
Nevertheless, before the Norms were even considered by the full
Council, the consensus was that the Council would not pass them.119 As
one U.N. representative noted at the time:
There is not much enthusiasm in Geneva for the Norms where it is
felt that the Sub-Commission was trying to do two different things:
i) distil everything from existing standards and ii) put this in treatylike language. This raises all kind [sic] of legal questions, as in the
end it is States that are responsible for human rights, not MNCs.120

Many felt that the Norms were, in effect, dead on arrival,121 and
indeed they were. When the Council took up the Norms in 2004, it
“expressed [its] appreciation to the Sub-Commission for the work it had
undertaken in preparing [the Norms] . . . . It affirmed, however, that the
document had not been requested and . . . had no legal standing.”122
118. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission, the two
bodies that voted on the Norms, no longer exist. The work that was undertaken by these
two committees is now taken up by the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee respectively. For the purpose of simplification, I
use the latter terms for each from this point forward, regardless of when the relevant
decision was rendered. For a timeline of when these names changed, see infra
Appendix A.
119. IRENE et al., The UN Norms for Business: Process, Content and Real Value,
10 (May 12, 2004), available at http://www.irene-network.nl/download/pubdebate.pdf
[hereinafter Public Debate Report].
120. Id.
121. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: the United
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger
of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
287, 288 (2006).
122. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summaries of Post-Sessional Meetings and Other
Activities of the Expanded Bureau During the Period from May to September 2004,
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Indeed, the response to the Norms, particularly among the business
community, was swift, ferocious, and effective.123 During public debate
on the Norms, Deputy-Director General of the Confederation of British
Industries stated: “It is quite wrong to suggest that firms are generally
involved in widespread abuse of human rights – where is the
evidence?”124
Ruggie himself was one of the Norms’ most vocal critics.
Reflecting back on the climate in which the Norms were created, Ruggie
stated:
The Norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses.
Even leaving aside the highly contentious though largely symbolic
proposal to monitor firms and provide for reparation payments to
victims, its exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities
created confusion and doubt even among many mainstream
international lawyers and other impartial observers. Two aspects are
particularly problematic in the context of this mandate. One concerns
the legal authority advanced for the Norms, and the other the
principle by which they propose to allocate human rights
responsibilities between states and firms.125

transmitted by Note of the Secretariat, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/IM/2004/2 (Sept. 28,
2004), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/informal/documents.htm.
In fact, the Sub-Commission had been working on the Norms for four years before they
submitted their final report. When asked during a public debate why the Commission
let the Sub-Commission work on the report for four years unmolested, Piet De Klerk,
Human Rights Ambassador responded, “[b]ecause it was not on the agenda.” Public
Debate Report, supra note 119.
123. LOUISE J. OBARA, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OPEN FOR BUSINESS? THE
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
available at http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/uploads/United_Nations_Commission_Open_for
_Business.pdf (discussing the business community’s response to the Norms and the
subsequent resolution requesting a Special Representative).
124. David Gow, CBI Cries Foul over U.N. Human Rights Code, GUARDIAN
(U. K.), Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/mar/08/globalisation.
Note that the business community once again employed its bystander strategy in an
effort to defeat the Norms. The argument did not focus on the frequency of human
rights abuses, but rather placed the burden of showing TNCs’ involvement on the
human rights victims and advocates.
125. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 59. Ruggie has asserted that many
human rights organizations have told him privately that they found the Norms to be a
“deeply flawed instrument.” JOHN RUGGIE, RESPONSE BY JOHN RUGGIE TO
MISEREOR/GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.reports-and-
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Ruggie’s argument reflects the two biggest complaints against the
Norms: their source of legitimacy and their target for accountability.126
In short, Ruggie and others argued that the Norms were created with no
legal mandate, while attempting to hold TNCs accountable under
international law. According to Ruggie, neither tenet properly reflected
international law at the time.127
Not everyone, however, agreed with Ruggie’s assessment. Some
scholars have argued that the Norms were merely a restatement of
international law at the time.128 Likewise, the Sub-Commission itself, in
materials.org/Ruggie-response-to-Misereor-GPF-2-Jun-2008.pdf
[hereinafter
RESPONSE: GLOBAL POLICY FORUM].
126. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 59.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 901, 915 (2003) (“Hence, the legal authority of the Norms
now derives principally from their sources in international law as a restatement of legal
principles applicable to companies, but they have room to become more binding in the
future.”); Backer, supra note 121, at 287-288 (“The Norms are unlikely to be adopted in
any sort of binding form in the current round of negotiation respecting its final form.”);
Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business
Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 55, 65 (2009) (“Although the U.N. Norms provide an
excellent framework for transnational corporations to implement internal codes of
conduct, there are no concrete enforcement measures, nor are there fully developed
monitoring and verification mechanisms.”); David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The
U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public
International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 482 (2006) (“The most that can be said
regarding the Norms’ legal status, is that any existing international law (as it applies to
states) that has been codified in sections of the Norms obviously retains its force as
international law and is unchanged by its re-statement in certain paragraphs of the
Norms. These paragraphs may be described as having a ‘declaratory effect’. They
merely reinforce rights contained in either customary international law or treaties.”);
see also Hum. Rts. Council, General Debate item 3 - Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations, Joint Statement 14th Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva (Jun.
4, 2010), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/JointBHRHRCStatement_HRW
_ESCRNet_2010.pdf (questioning Ruggie’s proposition “that the corporate
responsibility to respect rights is not an obligation that current international human
rights law generally imposes directly on companies but rather constitutes ‘a standard of
expected social conduct’”).
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the Norms’ introduction, argued that they were legal restatements,
crafted, as one author notes, in “an attempt to comprehend and
understand international law and gather it together in one document for
easy reference by transnational corporations and human rights
activists.”129
Indeed, the disconnect between the Sub-Commission’s unanimous
vote to adopt the Norms and its eventual defeat by Council has been
largely overlooked.130 Part of the reason for the defeat may have been
process. The Sub-Commission was not operating under a mandate when
it drafted the Norms. In addition, the first time the issue was placed on
the full Council’s agenda came only after the Sub-Commission had
already adopted the Norms. The full Council might have felt blindsided, particularly after the TNC lobbying effort went into effect.131
However, an equally likely explanation for the Norms’ defeat is the
clear accountability structure that the Norms would have placed on
corporations. Many business representatives pointed to the Global
Compact as a more suitable paradigm for assessing corporate
performance in the arena of human rights.132 In contrast, given the
Norm’s enforcement mechanisms, it is of little wonder that the human
rights community was quick to embrace them.133
Despite the Norms’ defeat, they represent, at a minimum, an
important historical moment in the evolution of the business and human
rights agenda. In reality, however, their importance is much greater. The
Norms represent an important shift in dialogue, whereby TNCs for the
first time were brought into the debate on human rights from an
accountability grounded framework rather than a voluntary framework.
That view is open to debate and in any case the law is highly dynamic and can adapt
to meet pressing needs. Looking to the future, there is important scope for the Council
to consider the actual and potential role of international law in further defining the
corporate responsibility for human rights.

Id.
129. Richard Williamson, Human Rights: A Common Cause, LEGALWEEK.COM
(Oct. 2, 2003, 1:00 AM).
130. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm, Rep. of the Sub-Comm’n on the
Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts. on its 55th Sess., July 28-Aug. 15, 2003, ¶ 81,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2 (Oct. 20, 2003) (by Stanislav Ogurtsov).
131. For an account of the lobbying efforts by businesses to defeat the Norms, see
Gow, supra note 124.
132. Williamson, supra note 129.
133. In fact, many of the NGOs that had worked on the Global Compact quickly
turned to the Norms as an alternative measuring stick for holding TNCs accountable. Id.
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Therefore, the Norms remain significant because they are, to date, the
only U.N.-generated document that provides an accountability
mechanism for TNCs on the issue of business and human rights. In this
way, the Norms continue to be a touchstone and resource for those
seeking to examine corporate responsibility from a legal rather than
simply moral standpoint.

C. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL’S MANDATES TO SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE JOHN RUGGIE
Once the Norms were defeated by the Council in 2005, advocates
could have reasonably thought that the U.N.’s business and human
rights agenda had permanently stalled.134 Instead, the Council’s next
action led to its most active period for the development of the subject. In
2005, the Council asked Annan to appoint a Special Representative to
report to the Council on human rights issues with regard to TNCs.135 The
Secretary-General appointed Ruggie.136 What followed were six years of
annual reports that had two key milestones: the development of the
At least one advocacy group that monitored the U.N.’s 61st session called the
Council’s work “disappointing.” In fact, the concerns by advocates regarding business
and human rights seemed to have been embroiled in larger concerns in the international
community regarding the overall effectiveness of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights. Hum. Rts. Watch, U.N. Rights Body Ignores Major Abuses: U.N. Commission
on Human Rights Takes a Few Positive Steps, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 21, 2005,
http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2005/04/21/un-rights-body-ignores-major-abuses.
135. Even this resolution was divisive. The business communities once again
lobbied against the appointment of a special representative, arguing that the U.N. was
the wrong arena for crafting legal human rights frameworks that apply to TNCs.
OBARA, supra note 123; Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/69: Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 59th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/doci
d/45377c80c.html.
135. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1.
136. Press Release, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States
Representative on Issues of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business
Enterprises (July 28, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377c80c
.html.
136. See 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1.
134.
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Respect Framework in 2008 and the U.N. Human Rights Council’s
approval of the Guiding Principles in 2011.
Generally, the purpose of the first mandate was to frame the issues
that affect TNCs in the field of human rights and provide context for the
official report that would succeed it. Specifically, Ruggie’s original
mandate was to






Identify (and where necessary, clarify) the various
standards that affect TNCs regarding human rights;
Discuss the role of the States and their duty in regulating
human rights abuses within their borders;
Research and clarify how terms such as “complicity” and
“sphere of influence” apply to TNCs;
Develop materials to assist TNCs in implementing human
rights impact assessments; and
Compile a “compendium of best practices” for both States
and TNCs to follow.137

In order to complete the first mandate, Ruggie spent much of his
time meeting with members of the world community, including “States,
non-governmental organizations, international business associations and
individual companies, international labour federations, United Nations
and other international agencies, and legal experts.”138 Human rights
advocates urged Ruggie to construct a framework based on the Norms.
The business community argued in favor of a Global Compact-like
mechanism. After his consultations, Ruggie issued an interim report on
February 22, 2006.139
1. The 2006 Interim Report
The purpose of the Interim Report was to provide context to the
Council regarding Ruggie’s mandate, set forth his strategy for fulfilling
the mandate, and summarize next steps.140 To that end, the Interim
137.
138.

See 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 3. Notably absent from this initial list was a discussion with the victims of
human rights abuses themselves. The 2006 Interim Report also alludes to the acrimony
that surrounded the drafting and voting on the U.N. Norms. Id. (commenting on “the
history that preceded its creation”).
139. See id.
140. Id. at Summary.
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Report summarizes the factors that led to the shifting landscape of
international law, specifically with regard to business and human rights.
To Ruggie, one of the most significant factors to change the business
and human rights landscape was the rise of globalization. As he pointed
out, at the time of the creation of the U.N. in 1945, the international
order was “state-based.” Ruggie noted that in the immediate aftermath
of World War II “the term ‘inter-national economy’ was still an accurate
spatial description of the prevailing reality.”141 Yet, since then, Ruggie
has noted that a “variety of actors for which the territorial State is not
the cardinal organizing principle have come to play significant public
roles.”142 His comments suggest that there is a growing recognition of
non-state actors, particularly corporations, that have legal personalities
in the international law realm.143
In light of this reality, Ruggie undertook in his 2007 Report to map
the various standards and mechanisms that the international arena had at
its disposal for business and human rights issues.
2. The 2007 Report
On February 9, 2007, Ruggie followed up his interim report with an
official report, which at the time was to end his mandate. The report,
entitled “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards

141. Id. ¶ 10. This idea of moving away from the spatial direction of the nation-state
has taken hold outside the arena of human rights work. For instance, Lara Putnam, a
history professor, discusses historians’ struggle to recount history without a nation-state
reference point. See Lara Putnam, To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the
Atlantic World, 30 J. SOC. HIST. 3 (Spring 2006).
142. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 10.
143. Later, Ruggie clarified this by suggesting that more and more, corporations are
becoming subjects of international law, just simply not in the context of international
human rights abuses. See Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 20; see also David
Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The
Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 480 (2006)
(“[I]t can be seen that companies, according to the widely accepted qualifying criteria,
have at least some form of legal personality in public international law. This is not
exactly the same type of personality as that of states, but this does not negate its
existence.”)
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of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,”144 was
submitted to the Council. The Report summarized the state of
international law with regard to business and human rights, but
specifically did not offer recommendations for the future as the mandate
requested. Instead, Ruggie requested an additional year to fulfill the
mandate’s request on this point.145
In the 2007 Report, Ruggie discusses the growing focus (in the
international arena) on ways to hold TNCs liable for human rights
violations.146 States have a duty to protect substantive rights abuses by
third parties, but a large number of States admit that they do not have
any policies, programs, or tools in place to deal with corporate human
rights abuses.147 In fact, many rely on the framework of voluntary
corporate initiatives for governance.148 Therefore, if a particular state has
no real accountability mechanism (such as in weak governance zones),
Ruggie acknowledges that victims are often left without recourse.149
The 2007 Report also refutes the idea that international law, at the
time of the Report, permitted the direct accountability of TNCs for
human rights violations.150 Therefore, the Report directly refutes legal
claims embodied in the Norms—namely that several human rights
treaties allow for direct accountability mechanisms for TNCs under
international law. Finally, while the Report does acknowledge the
existence of various “soft law” mechanisms—whereby voluntary
initiatives may be the source for future binding actions—Ruggie claims

144.
145.

2007 Report, supra note 9.
Id. at ¶ 9. Although outside the scope of this Article, the 2007 Report flagged
the extraterritorial obligations that one State may undertake when another State is not
adequately protecting the people within its borders from human rights abuses. 2007
Report, supra note 9, ¶ 15. Ruggie assesses that, under current international law, a State
is neither required nor prohibited from exercising some power—particularly in those
instances when the people needing protection are the nationals of another State. Id. at
n.5.
146. Id. ¶ 44 (stating that “corporations are under growing scrutiny by the
international human rights mechanisms”).
147. 2007 Report, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 16-17.
148. Id. at ¶ 17.
149. See id. ¶ 16 (“The increasing focus on protection against corporate abuse by the
U.N. treaty bodies and regional mechanisms indicates growing concern that states either
do not fully understand or are not always able or willing to [fulfill] this duty.”).
150. Id. ¶ 44.
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that “no definitive standards yet exist by which to assess [these
mechanisms].”151
The most promising aspect of the 2007 Report is its discussion of
notions of complicity under international law for TNCs and human
rights abuses. According to the 2007 Report:
Corporate complicity is an umbrella term for a range of ways in
which companies may be liable for their participation in criminal or
civil wrongs. . . . The international tribunals have developed a fairly
clear standard for criminal aiding and abetting liability: knowingly
providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that
has a substantial effect on the commission of a crime.152

The term “moral support,” although not adopted universally,153
would seem to capture a widening array of actions, or even inactions. As
Ruggie notes, some tribunals have even used the element to include
“silent presence coupled with authority.”154 According to Ruggie, there
is very little clarity on what factual scenarios would constitute moral
support.155
This dilemma highlights why developing a bystander framework is
so important. States are either unable or unwilling to provide the
protection for corporate related abuses. As Ruggie writes:
[O]f those states responding very few report having policies,
programs or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate human
rights challenges. A larger number say they rely on the framework of
corporate responsibility initiatives, including such soft law

151.
152.
153.

Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added).
For instance, as Ruggie notes, the court in Unocal did not adopt this as an
element in its analysis of complicity. Id. ¶ 31 n.29.
154. Id. ¶ 32.
155. Id. The focus of moral support seems to be related to (1) a direct or indirect
benefit and (2) some form of assistance (and therefore action). Therefore, while
promising (and probably the closest idea to a bystander framework) this element still
falls short of providing a meaningful basis for a bystander-based accountability
structure.
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instruments as the OECD Guidelines or voluntary initiatives like the
Global Compact.156

This is ironic particularly given how many TNCs tout the use of
voluntary mechanisms, and how many States rely on these voluntary
mechanisms.157
Overall, the 2007 Report provided an extensive assessment of
current international law in the area of business and human rights. While
the 2007 Report was undoubtedly helpful in providing the foundation
for Ruggie and his work, it was not until the 2008 Report, which
contained Ruggie’s recommendations, that the U.N. came into its own
on the issue of business and human rights.
3. The 2008 Report: “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
On April 7, 2008, Ruggie submitted his second official report.158
This second official report, entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights” (the “Framework” or the
“Respect Framework”), provided Ruggie’s views and recommendations
on the best way to address business and human rights issues.
The Framework stands on three essential pillars: (1) the State’s
legal duty to protect individuals and communities from human rights
abuses committed by others, including corporations; (2) a responsibility
by corporations to respect human rights; and (3) an amelioration of
current remedy mechanisms when human rights abuses have occurred.159
To some extent, the contents of the Respect Framework reflect the
Global Compact, relating back in various ways to the spirit surrounding
Ruggie’s earlier work.160 For instance, the Framework carries on the
156.
157.

Id. ¶ 17.
The irony continues: given the clear lack of success these voluntary
mechanisms have had in redressing human rights abuses, it is odd that a voluntary
mechanism is still the primary framework in this area.
158. In his first official report, Ruggie requested more time to complete this part of
the mandate.
159. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 9.
160. This may have been intentional. Given the acrimony and bitterness surrounding
both the Norms themselves and the appointment of a Special Representative, Ruggie
may have felt that the best policy was to hearken back to the policy he knew and for
which he had already developed goodwill. Notably, the Framework and its
implementation document, the Guiding Principles, nevertheless contained significant
elements of the Norms.
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Global Compact’s policy tradition by having no accountability
mechanism for corporations. In fact, the Framework explicitly rejects
the Norms’ attempt to craft TNC accountability mechanisms.161
Furthermore, Ruggie argues that “as economic actors, companies have
unique responsibilities. If those responsibilities are entangled with State
obligations, it makes it difficult if not impossible to tell who is
responsible for what in practice.”162 His contention suggests that the
responsibility outlined in the Framework is in no way a legal one, but
rather a values-based normative goal in which TNCs aspire to respect
human rights.163 According to Ruggie, weak governance zones where
TNCs are located are a primary challenge, and the 2008 Report once
again emphasizes that “governance gaps are at the root of the business
and human rights predicament.”164 In those areas, respecting human
rights is increasingly problematic.
Later in the Respect Framework, Ruggie raises the issue of TNC
accountability within the context of spheres of influence165 and a
company’s due diligence.166 Ruggie states, “the scope of due diligence
to meet the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is not a
fixed sphere, nor is it based on influence. Rather, it depends on the
potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from a company’s
business activities and the relationships connected to those activities.”167
In doing so, Ruggie seems to reject the premise that TNCs have a
specific, heightened duty for monitoring those human rights issues that
affect their core business enterprises.
All in all, notwithstanding its flaws, the Respect Framework is a
great achievement. In the words of one scholar, it will act as “an
authoritative focal point that could help bring coherence to the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 65–72.
Id. ¶¶ 56–59.
Id. ¶ 72.
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complexity of the business-human rights relationship.”168 Even though
the Respect Framework lacks an accountability mechanism for TNCs, it
gives very specific recommendations to TNCs seeking to navigate the
business and human rights terrain.
On June 18, 2008, The U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously
adopted the Respect Framework and, by Resolution,169 renewed
Ruggie’s term under a new mandate.170 The new mandate provided for
eight specific requests, including







Ruggie’s views and “practical recommendations” on states’
duties regarding business and human rights issues;
More information regarding the interaction between
corporate responsibility and human rights issues, along with
“concrete guidance” on this to corporations and other
stakeholders;
Options and recommendations for ways to improve victims’
access to remedies when corporate activities lead to human
rights abuses;
Best practices for TNCs on the issue of business and human
rights; and
Annual updates.171

In response to the Council’s second mandate, Ruggie undertook an
additional three-year term that involved a specific implementation
program and a campaign to promote the Respect Framework. This
culminated in the Guiding Principles.172
168. Christiana Ochoa, The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and
Human Rights, 12 AM. SOC’Y INT.’L L. 1, 8 (Jun. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights080618.cfm.
169. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and other Bus. Enter.,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents
/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶¶ 4(a)–(c), (e), (h).
172. Guiding Principles, supra note 8. In the intervening years, Ruggie also
provided the Council with annual reports on his progress. These included: the 2009
Report (discussing, among other things, the financial crisis’s impact on business and
human rights issues) and the 2010 Report. See 2009 Report, supra note 101; Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. & Transn’l Corp. &
Other Bus. Enter., Report on: Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the
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THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

On March 21, 2011, Ruggie presented his Guiding Principles to the
U.N. Human Rights Council for consideration. Through the Principles,
Ruggie attempted to operationalize the Framework that he had
submitted to the Council three years before. The Principles, as well as
the Respect Framework on which they were based, were welcomed by
the international community as a workable and practical framework to
guide businesses and other stakeholders on how to implement a system
to prevent and, if they occurred, redress human rights violations. The
Principles consist of a number of foundational principles derived from
the spirit of the Respect Framework, as well as new operational
principles that build on the concepts embedded in the foundational
principles.173 In addition, Ruggie provides commentary for many of the
issues outlined in the Principles.
Moreover, Ruggie made significant efforts to vet the Principles
with the public and with all interested stakeholders before he presented
them to the Council. For instance, on December 1, 2009, Ruggie
launched a global online forum and requested comments regarding
operationalizing the Respect Framework.174 From November 22, 2010,
to January 31, 2011, Ruggie posted a draft of the Guiding Principles and
then solicited comments on their themes. Comments flowed in. In all,
Ruggie received approximately 163 comments on various aspects of the

Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts.
Council, ¶¶ 16–53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available
at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf (focusing on the Respect Framework’s
first pillar, the State’s duty to protect).
173. Guiding Principles, supra note 8.
174. The Forum closed in February 2011. Since then, the portal has been taken
down and can no longer be accessed. For a press release of the launch see Press
Release, United Nations, New Online Forum for Business & Human Rights Mandate,
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/newsandstories/s
rsg_forum_launch.pdf. While the forum initially focused on corporate responsibility to
respect human rights, it was subsequently expanded to comment on all aspects of the
Guiding Principles.
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draft.175 Notably, many of the proposed changes that people suggested
made their way into the final Principles.176
In addition, Ruggie requested specific feedback from key
stakeholders, soliciting expert consultations and convening working
groups and workshops.177 As a result, when the final Principles were
submitted, they had wide-ranging endorsement from diverse
stakeholders including specific businesses178 and industries,179
governments,180 and nongovernmental organizations.181
The human rights community, while receptive, was slightly more
muted in welcoming the Principles. While prominent organizations
praised the Principles,182 many other organizations felt that the
175. Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Bus. &
Hum. Rts., Online Forum (edited repository), (2011), http://www.business-humanr
ights.org/media/documents/ruggie/online-forum-re-guiding-principles-nov-2010-to-jan2011.pdf.
176. Id. ¶ 5 (“absent any internationally-recognized hierarchy of treaty obligations,
States are unlikely to place every single human right they have recognized above their
legal obligations”). Cf. Guiding Principles, supra note 8 (eliminating that language).
This statement, in particular, drew a number of comments questioning its accuracy.
177. Document List, supra note 15, at 15.
178. See, e.g., ING Congratulates U.N. Special Representative John Ruggie & His
Team on Endorsement of Guiding Principles, ONESOCIETYINITIATIVE.ORG, June 24,
2011, http://onesocietyinitiative.org/ing-congratulates-un-special-representative-john-ru
ggie-a-his-team-on-endorsement-of-guiding-principles-80 (stating that the Principles
are “an important milestone in the protection and promotion of human rights linked to
business activities”).
179. Letter of Support from the Int’l Bus. Leaders Forum for the U.N. Protect,
Respect and Remedy Framework, to John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org
/Links/Repository/1006814.
180. See, e.g., Press Release, Humanrights.gov, Businesses and Transactional
Corporations Have a Responsibility to Respect Human Rights (June 16, 2011),
available at http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/16/businesses-and-transnational-corp
orations-have-a-responsibility-to-respect-human-rights/ (“The United States is pleased
to cosponsor this Resolution [adopting the Guiding Principles]”).
181. See, e.g., Public Statement, Document - United Nations: A Call for Action to
Better Protect the Rights of Those Affected by Business-Related Human Rights Abuses,
AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL.ORG (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/e
n/library/asset/IOR40/009/2011/en/55fab4a5-fb8a-4572-93f3-67581b2dca45/ior400092
011en.html (stating that the Respect Framework should be “the focal point for moving
forward”).
182. Id. (stating that Ruggie was to be “commended for developing and raising
awareness on the Framework”).
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Principles were fundamentally flawed because they did not include
either a mandatory system or a monitoring mechanism.183 Thus, in one
sense, the Principles might have been seen as more of the same, relying
on businesses to self-monitor in order to achieve benefits for affected
communities much like previous frameworks.184
While the critics’ claims do have some merit, a solid analysis of the
Principles requires a much more nuanced approach. A comprehensive
analysis of the Principles must include not simply an analysis of the text
itself, but also a review of the following: (1) the context and climate in
which the Principles arose (as well as a comparison of the climate in
which the Norms were given); and (2) the process through which they
were drafted. Without taking these factors into account, a full analysis of
the Principles will be incomplete.
A. THE BACKGROUND
Some185 have attributed the widespread acceptance of the Guiding
Principles to the transparent process that Ruggie undertook in his work,
including giving speeches, presenting interim reports, having sector

183. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council Adopts Guiding Principles on Business
Conduct, yet Victims Still Waiting for Effective Remedies, FIDH (June 17, 2011),
available at http://www.fidh.org/UN-Human-Rights-Council-adopts-Guiding-Principles
(proffering its main criticism, which is the lack of remedies available: “FIDH, along
with several civil society organisations, has expressed concern on certain weaknesses in
the Principles during the drafting process, in particular on the right to an effective
remedy and the need for States’ measures to prevent abuses committed by their
companies overseas.”); Hum. Rts. Watch, News Release, U.N. Human Rights Council:
Weak Stance on Business Standards, June 16, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/
16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-standards (“‘The council failed to
put in place a mechanism to ensure that the basic steps to protect human rights set forth
in the Guiding Principles are put into practice,’ Human Rights Watch said.”).
184. See Marcy Murninghan, Human Rights: A Moral and Material Business
Concern, THE MURNINGHAN POST, June 30, 2011, http://www.murninghanpost.com/20
11/06/30/human-rights-a-moral-and-material-business-concern/.
185. Letter from John K.S. Wilson, Dir.-Corp. Governance, TIAA-CREF, to John
Ruggie, Special Representative of U.N. Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts., (May
10, 2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/
tiaa-cref-ltr-to-ruggie-re-guiding-principles-10-may-2011.pdf.
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consultations and holding legal workshops.186 In addition, Ruggie’s
work in responding to the U.N. mandates can be seen as nothing less
than thorough. Besides drafting and preparing reports for the Council,
the work Ruggie and his team did included (1) undertaking a full
analysis of the various treaties that implicate corporate activities and
human rights issues; (2) convening legal workshops on a number of
issues affecting business and human rights; (3) reviewing methodologies
of human rights impact assessments for TNCs; (4) surveying numerous
corporations regarding how they handle corporate social responsibility
issues; and (5) reviewing State and regional provisions regarding
business and human rights.187
As a result, a number of different legal organizations endorsed
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles. The International Bar Association’s CSR
committee called the measure “timely, practical guidance on many
complex issues of business and human rights”188 and urged the Council
to endorse them. The International Senior Lawyers Project stated that
“the Principles will undoubtedly [be] the starting point for guiding—and
judging—business efforts to identify, manage and remedy human
rights.”189
In addition, while business communities had some initial
misgivings after the draft Guiding Principles began to circulate, law
firms took great strides to reassure their (often corporate) clients that
neither the Guiding Principles nor the Respect Framework was attaching
legal accountability to TNCs.190

186.
187.
188.

See generally Document List, supra note 15.
See generally id.
Letter from Craig Phillips, Co-Chair IBA CSR Committee, and Kenneth
Thompson II, Co-Chair IBA CSR Committee, to John Ruggie, Special Representative
of U.N. Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts. (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/intl-bar-association-ltrto-ruggie-25-may-2011.pdf.
189. Memorandum from Int’l Seniors Law. Project (May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/intl-senior-lawyers-proj
ect-ltr-re-guiding-principles-12-may-2011.pdf.
190. See, e.g., Memorandum from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP on Corporate
Social Responsibility for Human Rights: Comments on the U.N. Special
Representative’s Report Entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for
Business and Human Rights” (May, 22, 2008), available at http://198.170.85.29/WeilGotshal-legal-commentary-on-Ruggie-report-22-May-2008.pdf (stating “we have been
assured by the Special Representative himself that . . . his use of the term
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This development of the Guiding Principles stands in stark contrast
to that of the Norms. Although it took over four years for the SubCommission to craft the Norms, they did so without any mandate by the
Council.191 In addition, while it seems the Sub-Commission solicited
some input from the business community,192 many corporations later
complained that the Sub-Commission undertook their work in a very
opaque way.193 Because Sub-Commission members who drafted the
Norms were acting in their personal capacities—not as representatives
of their governments194—they were not bound by the political
considerations of the full Council.195 Given this lack of transparency,
open communication and political considerations, it seems likely that
part of the reason why the Norms were rejected, almost out of hand,
stemmed at least in part from their opaque process.196
B. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
The Guiding Principles consist of eight foundational principles and
twenty-four operational principles. They address a variety of issues in
the area of business and human rights, including state-owned business,
human rights impact assessments and implementation of corporate
responsibilities for business and human rights issues.
Building on the three pillars originally outlined in the Respect
Framework (a State’s Duty to Protect individuals from human rights
abuse; TNCs’ duty to respect human rights; and increased access to
‘responsibility’ in the Report refers to moral obligations and social expectations—not
binding law.”).
191. Public Debate Report, supra note 119.
192. Williamson, supra note 129.
193. Kinley et al., supra note 64, at 464.
194. Williamson, supra note 129.
195. In fact, many of them were law professors. Id.
196. Of course, an equally likely explanation is that the lack of transparency was
merely used as a red herring by business leaders and States to avoid the accountability
provisions of the Norms. For instance, one of the main criticisms lodged against the
Norms was that it was created without a mandate of the full Council. However, drafting
without a mandate apparently had precedent at the U.N. Kinley et al., supra note 64, at
466 (offering a far-reaching review of the politics and backdoor negotiations that led to
the Norm’s defeat).

2012]

“THE END OF THE BEGINNING?”

919

remedies for victims of human rights violations) the Principles provide
concrete, practical solutions for TNCs who wish to craft a workable
policy regarding business and human rights.197
The Principles also reaffirm their nonlegal accountability
framework. For instance, in Ruggie’s commentary accompanying the
foundational principle that outlines the legal foundation for “the
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights,”198 he
makes clear that “the responsibility of business enterprises to respect
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement,
which remains defined largely by national law provisions in relevant
jurisdictions.”199 Once again, the Principles emphasize that the term
“responsibility” (as discussed in the Respect Framework and here) is not
in any way meant to convey legal responsibility on the part of TNCs.
Rather, it is designed to encourage moral responsibility based on shared
societal values regarding human rights issues.
Notably, however, within the parameter of corporate responsibility,
the Principles are specific. The document lays out five foundational
principles to guide TNCs in their responsibilities concerning human
rights. First, it states that TNCs should respect human rights by avoiding
infringing on the human rights of others.200 Second, various legal
instruments should be used to determine the appropriate TNC human
rights standards.201 Third, in order to respect human rights, TNCs should
“avoid causing or contributing” to human rights abuses and “prevent or
mitigate” human rights activities that are linked to their operations.202
Fourth, while all corporations (regardless of size) are responsible for
respecting human rights, how businesses manage this responsibility will
vary based on the size and structure of the operation, as well as the
severity of its human rights impacts.203 Finally, TNCs must develop and

197. While all three pillars implicate business and human rights, this Article focuses
on the responsibilities TNCs have to respect human rights.
198. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, § II.A, ¶ 12, at 13.
199. Id. at 13–14 (accompanying commentary).
200. Id. § II.A, ¶ 11, at 13.
201. Id. § II.A, ¶ 12. These instruments include the International Bill of Rights and
the International Labor Organization’s Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (accompanying commentary).
202. Id. § II.A, ¶ 13, at 14.
203. Id. § II.A, ¶ 14.
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implement specific policies and procedures to help maintain
responsibility for human rights.204
In order to operationalize these foundational principles, Ruggie
states that TNCs should demonstrate a firm commitment to the issues
regarding business and human rights by integrating the subject
throughout the corporate structure.205 In addition, TNCs must conduct
due diligence, including assessments of how their operations (both
actual and potential) will impact the community around them
(specifically from a human rights perspective).206 This assessment
should be done early and updated regularly, to ensure that the situations
that TNCs initially evaluated have not changed.207 Finally, TNCs should
integrate the results from their assessments208 into all aspects of their
operations, consult with experts and other stakeholders, track the
response to their human rights policies, and maintain transparency and
open communications with stakeholders on these issues.209
The Principles also state that, should a TNC’s activities result in
adverse human rights impacts, the TNC should immediately take steps
to redress and remediate the harm.210 The Principles, and the Respect
Framework on which they are based, provide extensive guidance to
TNCs who face legitimate questions regarding their role in human rights
issues.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. § II.A, ¶ 15, at 15.
Id. § II.B, ¶ 16.
Id. § II.B, ¶ 17, at 16.
Id. (and accompanying commentary).
As it stands now, many business partners seem to be in favor of a move
towards internal TNC human rights impacts assessment. See, e.g., Letter from Robert
Davies, Chief Exec. Officer, Int’l Bus. Leaders Forum, to John Ruggie, U.N. Special
Representative to the Secretary-General on Bus. & Hum. Rts., (Jan. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/). However, some in the
United States are concerned that producing additional assessments would create
additional legal liability for corporations. 2009 Report, supra note 101. Ruggie
dismisses these concerns by arguing that the call for greater disclosure will lead to legal
liability only if a corporation omits or misrepresents material facts. Id. at ¶ 82 (2009
Report).
209. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, § II.B, ¶¶ 18–21, at 17–20.
210. Id. § II.B, ¶ 22, at 20.
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Overall, the Principles are incomplete, notwithstanding the
significant leap forward taken by the Principles and the Respect
Framework regarding a bystander paradigm in their discussion of TNCs’
relationships (not just actions) as a source for assessing appropriate
responses. Because the Principles rely on a system of self-monitoring
for TNCs and remain silent on accountability mechanisms, they offer a
more modest approach to tackling the issue of business and human
rights than the Sub-Commission’s work with the Norms. For some, it
seems apparent that Ruggie’s work did not go far enough. One writer
states that Ruggie’s report, although identifying governance gaps, does
not in fact respond to those gaps with solutions: “Instead, it is limited to
what its author deems politically achievable.”211
C. IMPACT ON A BYSTANDER FRAMEWORK
There is no doubt that Ruggie’s work will influence the
development of international human rights law. Previously, issues of
corporate actors and human rights had been dealt with under specific
subject matters, such as labor issues and workers’ rights. There was
little, if any, dialogue in the international law arena that discussed ideas
211. JENS MARTENS, PROBLEMATIC PRAGMATISM, THE RUGGIE REPORT 2008:
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVES 1 (Elisabeth Strohscheidt, Misereor, ed.,
June 2008), available at http://www.wdev.eu/downloads/martensstrohscheidt.pdf. For
Ruggie’s vigorous response to the piece see RESPONSE: GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra
note 125. While Ruggie does not deny the claim that his report was politically
expedient (“[o]ne obvious question to ask is what purpose would be served by making
recommendations that aren’t feasible”), he takes issue with the tone of the Global
Policy Report stating: “I would have hoped that the level of maturity in the business and
human rights debate would have been sufficiently elevated by now for these tactics to
have been confined to a dust bin.” Id. In the end, some scholars tend to agree that
Ruggie achieved the best result he could under the circumstances. For instance, John
Knox, in analyzing Ruggie’s approach to his mandate summarized the challenge
Ruggie faced:
This situation presented Ruggie with an extraordinarily difficult political calculus. To
develop a consensus on how to bring human rights law to bear on corporations,
Ruggie had to propose an alternative to the Norms that addressed the desire for a
robust application of human rights law to corporations but did not alienate the
governments whose cooperation would be necessary to make the proposal effective.

John Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations
(forthcoming in RUGGIE’S MANDATE), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
s.cfm?abstract_id=1916664.
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regarding corporations and human rights. While the Norms were one
attempt at the U.N. level to have that conversation, a substantive
evaluation of their objectives is difficult because of the controversy in
which they were mired. In contrast, Ruggie’s work and transparent
process in the area of business and human rights allowed the
development of a clear and detailed map of the current terrain. What is
more, his work has also paved the way, in some respects, for
transformation in the future development of international human rights
law.
For instance, the Respect Framework and the Guiding Principles
represent the first time that the issue of business and human rights has
had the imprimatur of the U.N. While this might seem like a modest
achievement, this is quite a significant milestone in light of the prior
absence of similar attention to the matter. In addition, it appears that the
U.N.’s work on business and human rights is continuing. Since the
Human Rights Council’s endorsement of the Guiding Principles, it has
established a working group whose mandate includes promoting and
disseminating the Guiding Principles, identifying best practices on
implementing the Guiding Principles, conducting country visits to
various States, and “develop[ing] a regular dialogue and discuss[ing]
possible areas of cooperation with Governments and all relevant
actors.”212
In addition to the impact on the human rights agenda generally,
more specifically, the Guiding Principles’ potential impact on the
bystander corporate accountability framework is also profound. As of
yet, there is no corporate accountability framework that specifically
encompasses TNCs as bystanders under international law. Nevertheless,
certain key elements that would be required for any effective bystander
accountability structure have begun to take shape with the help of recent
developments. For example, an effective bystander accountability
framework should have at its foundation of liability, a structure that is
not based on overt action, or even complicity, but rather on relationship.

212. Human Rights Council Res., Human Rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (Jul. 6, 2011), available at http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement.
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To that end, both the Respect Framework and the Guiding Principles are
significant.
1. The tripartite relationship in human rights abuses
An integral part of understanding the bystander framework is to
acknowledge that, oftentimes, there are in fact three people in a
relationship: the victim, the aggressor, and the witness.213 So, for
instance, a TNC contracts out work to security guards (often off-duty
militia). The security guards then commit untold horrors, harming
people in the surrounding community. In this instance, the security
detail are aggressors having committed the actual abuse, and the people
in the community that suffered the abuse are victims. A lawsuit is
brought against the TNC, but the TNC denies any involvement. Thus,
the only reasonable role left for the TNC is that of a witness.
Moreover, while the Norms made mention of the idea that TNCs
need to be vigilant in their dealings with contractors214 and States,215 the
Guiding Principles more explicitly discuss the concept of relationship as
a basis for TNC responsibility. This concept of relationship is at the
heart of the bystander rhetoric. The bystander framework acknowledges
that relationships are important and that the tripartite relationship among
victim, witness, and aggressor (whether that aggressor is the State or
whether that aggressor is a third-party actor) can come in line with some
of the responsibilities of TNCs.
Likewise, in the Guiding Principles, Ruggie acknowledges that
TNCs, not simply by their actions, but also by their relationships, can
negatively impact human rights. Therefore, Principle 13 encourages
TNCs to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that
are directly linked to their . . . relationships.”216 The accompanying
commentary further elaborates on this concept by distinguishing
between activities (which can encompass both actions and omission)
and relationships.217 Practically speaking, this means TNC activity can
negatively impact human rights either through action or inaction, and
either from its operations or its relationships. Moreover, the result is an

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 48.
Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 11.
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at ¶ 13.
Id.
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interesting diagram for mapping a bystander framework whereby a
TNC’s actions (presumably in direct connection with its operations) can
raise the possibility of liability, and a TNC’s inactions (in direct
connection with its relationships) can also raise liability. In that case, a
framework is needed that encompasses these issues and links the
relationship that the TNC has with the aggressor, to the duty.
2. Sphere of influence and the bystander framework
Also noteworthy in the continuing human rights dialogue, is the
evolution of the term ‘sphere of influence’ and its potential impact on
the bystander framework.218 As originally used in the Global Compact,
sphere of influence seemed operationally based—discussing spheres in
which the company could exercise the most control. These would
normally be those areas related to a company’s core business activities.
This concept expanded under the Norms, where it encompassed both an
operational form of influence and a spatial form of influence. This

218. The term “sphere of influence” within the context of business and human rights
has also evolved. Originally introduced in the Global Compact during Annan’s speech
on the subject, the term then became a part of the first principle. However, since 2005,
the term was struck from the first principle and is now simply a part of the preamble.
Later, it was revealed that John Ruggie, one of the most vocal critics of the term sphere
of influence in the U.N. Norms, confessed in April 2010 that he was actually the one
who co-opted the term for the business and human rights framework. See Global
Compact Critics, How Sphere of Influence Was Introduced into the Global Compact,
GLOBALCOMPACTCRITICS.BLOGSPOT.COM
(May
8,
2010),
http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/2010/05/global-compacts-principle-onesubject.html. In fact, by the time of the 2008 Report, Ruggie argued in favor of
abandoning the term altogether as he believed it to be “unhelpful for further elucidating
the boundaries of the responsibility to respect.” John Ruggie, Response by John Ruggie
to Ethical Corporation Magazine, REPORTS-AND-MATERIALS.ORG (June 5, 2008),
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-response-Ethical-Corp-5-Jun-2008
.pdf [hereinafter Response: Ethical Corp. Mag.]. For a discussion on the origins of the
term sphere of influence see Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Report Clarifying the
Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity,” Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-companion-report-15-May-2008.pdf.
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expansion made room, whether intended or not,219 for the bystander
theory to come into play. Thus, the term sphere of influence now
implicates bystander theory.
At its heart, the bystander framework is a methodology for shifting
the corporate accountability dialogue away from the overt actions of a
TNC to the impacts that a TNC’s relationships has on human rights
violations. This shift, although not explicitly stated in the form of
bystander rhetoric, is implicit in the U.N.’s evolving view of business
and human rights. Therefore, it is plausible for the bystander framework
to develop as an accountability mechanism when TNCs have significant
relationships with would-be perpetrators of human rights atrocities.
From this perspective, the Guiding Principles are a positive
development. They mark a shift from an implicit acknowledgment of
control in TNCs’ relationships (as discussed in the Global Compact) to
an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of relationship to
preventing human rights abuses.220

219. Indeed, Ruggie is emphatic that sphere of influence should not be used to
extend accountability to TNCs based on relationships. He writes:
[I]t is not reasonable to attribute responsibility to companies solely on the basis of
“influence” understood as “leverage.” I note that sphere of influence combines
together two very different meanings of influence: one is influence as “impact,”
where the company may be the cause of the harm; the other is influence as whatever
“leverage’” a company may be able to exert over other actors with which it may or
may not have a business relation. Impact falls squarely within a company’s
responsibility to respect human rights; leverage may or may not, depending on
circumstances.

Response: Ethical Corp. Mag., supra note 218.
This is the leap that Ruggie seems unwilling to make but that he set up by
developing the accountability structure. However, this is the very leap that the
bystander framework makes by addressing the leverage that a company’s relationship
with an actor (particularly the State) can have on human rights violations. In essence,
Ruggie’s Reports, Framework, and Guiding Principles dance around the edges. They
cite the problem and even discuss how relationships are important, but they do not
address squarely the implication that an accountability structure for corporations is
appropriate. Perhaps this disconnect is inevitable. In order to get buy-in from the
business community, Ruggie needed to create a nonbinding mechanism, rendering him
unable to make the leap to an accountability structure based on relationship. Until this
structure is achieved, however, human rights violations will continue to occur and
companies will persist in hiding behind bystander rhetoric in order to escape liability.
220. The relationship aspect of the bystander framework is crucial. This is the
relationship that creates the duty and the breach of that duty that can lead to a TNC’s
liability, even through their inaction.
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3. The bystander framework and the
TNC’s relationship with the State
One key piece is missing from any of the frameworks articulated to
date—the relationship between the TNC and the State. Each of the
U.N.’s foundational documents on business and human rights looked at
the issue of the TNC and its relationship primarily through the lens of
the TNC’s relationship with other private parties.221 The Norms, for
instance, specifically discussed sphere of influence within the context of
a TNC’s work with vendors, suppliers, and other contractors. Ruggie’s
work expands on this discussion, including weak governance zones that
may make it difficult for a TNC to navigate human rights issues.
However, Ruggie’s direct linkage of a TNC to a State, as a relationship
resulting in adverse human rights impacts, is weak. For instance, in the
Respect Framework, Ruggie discusses a corporation’s responsibility to
respect human rights. Specifically, he addresses “the context in which a
company is operating, its activities, and the relationship associated with
those activities”222 as factors that should be considered in assessing that
responsibility, without stating that a relationship with the State might be
important to this calculation. Later, in the Respect Framework, the
relationship between the State and the TNC appears but is understated.
The Respect Framework discusses whether TNCs can contribute to
abuse “through the relationships connected to their activities, such as
with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State
actors.”223 State agencies are simply cast in a long line of other actors
whose relationships with TNCs may create adverse human rights
impacts.
Furthermore, there are unique power dynamics in a TNC’s
relationship with a State. The State, eager to accommodate the TNC,
allows the TNC almost free reign, even changing its laws to make it

221. Some have argued that one of the Norms’ biggest flaws is that it took that step
when it discussed the primary relationship of the States vis-à-vis TNCs. However, the
Norms’ language regarding the primary responsibility of States and the secondary
responsibility of TNCs is too amorphous to be of any help in this analysis.
222. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 25.
223. Id. ¶ 57.
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more hospitable for the TNC’s activities.224 Once it arrives, the TNC’s
wealth and influence oftentimes dwarfs that of the Host State,225 leading
to stark power differentials that are not taken into consideration in our
current accountability structure. Omitting these dynamics from current
legal analysis has resulted in an incomplete framework, especially
considering that many human rights abuses may arise from relationships
between TNCs and States. In addition, the lack of explicit attention
given to these relationships leaves open the door for improper
assumptions that the consequences arising from TNCs’ relationships
with States are the same as the consequences that arise from TNCs’
relationships with all other actors. This is clearly false and demonstrates
how grouping these relationships together can create an inaccurate
picture that can exacerbate the gaps in the current accountability
structure.
Although States can be held accountable for their acts, creating a
separate accountability structure based on TNCs’ relationships with
States decouples the actions (or inactions) of each actor and minimizes
the ability of each to hide behind the acts of the other. This transparency
is essential to the development of human rights law. In short, much of
TNCs’ involvement today with respect to human rights abuses, if
performed by a State, can be considered coercive and lead to legal
accountability.226 Given TNCs’ level of power and influence, it is
necessary to examine TNCs with the same level of scrutiny and
accountability as States.

224. For an excellent example of this, see the discussion supra Section I.B. on
Union Carbide and the Bhopal disaster.
225. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 5.
226. The idea that human rights are underpinned with a freedom from coercion has
deep jurisprudential roots and appears in many facets of business and human rights
work. For instance, Professor Anne Marie Lofaso has written extensively on the notion
of workers’ rights stemming from freedom from coercion. Moreover, Professor Lofaso
points out that it is not merely the State that is a source of coercion, but also most
institutions. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’
Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (discussing
the different jurisprudential theories regarding an individual worker and coercive
institutions). Following this idea, it is reasonable to assume that the TNC, as an
institution, is a large source of coercion. International law’s inability to address this is
one of its biggest governance gaps. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers’ Rights as Human
Rights: Regaining Autonomy and Human Dignity at the U.S. Workplace (forthcoming,
peer review with Queens Law Journal).
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In addition, a framework that does not take into account the unique
relationship between a TNC and a State removes one of the main
benefits of the paradigm—incentivizing proactive vigilance on the part
of TNCs for human rights violations. Thus, accounting for this
relationship is essential, and an effective bystander framework cannot
allow benefits to improperly accrue to a TNC as a result of a State’s
oppressive conduct.
There are many other issues within the Guiding Principles and the
Respect Framework that implicate the bystander framework.227
However, focusing on TNCs’ relationships, particularly with the State,
as a basis for establishing an accountability structure will go a long way
towards developing a workable system under international law.
Notwithstanding the benefits of the bystander framework,
incorporating nonfeasance into a theory of accountability will no doubt
cause consternation for TNCs and other business enterprises that have
previously hidden behind a veil of inactivity. This is not at all surprising.
It is also paradoxical that TNCs demand a seat at the table for all
international dealings that might affect their bottom line—how they
interact with their trade partners, labor, suppliers, and subsidiaries—and
yet do not take responsibility when the fruits of those relationships,
namely relationships with actors who commit human rights abuses, yield
terrible results. Allowing a framework to develop that focuses on the
nonfeasance of corporations could have a remarkable impact in
227. For instance, another interesting issue that has evolved in the documents
propounded by the U.N. and its agents is the consideration of culture as an important
factor in changing or preventing human rights abuses. Culture is important to the
dialogue generally because it sets the tone for what is and is not deemed acceptable.
However, it also has greater significance for the bystander framework. Elsewhere, I
have contended that a bystander analysis has been used even in situations where the
TNC itself has actively participated in the harm caused. In those situations, it is the
individual executives of TNCs who co-opt the language of the bystander framework by
stating that their TNC’s culture is predominantly hostile to issues regarding human
rights (or other violations), and that they themselves are mere bystanders. Martin
Amerson, supra note 10, at 23. Emphasizing that a corporation’s culture is important
and has a significant impact on human rights issues may close another loophole for
high-level executives who wish to claim that they were powerless against the culture of
a TNC.
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diminishing human rights abuses that are linked to corporate activity.
Knowing that their relationships with potentially responsible actors,
including States, could be significant enough to result in liability, TNCs
will be incentivized to engage at the highest level to ensure that the
standards for human rights are being upheld. Executives and CEOs, for
example, might become conversant in impact assessments that affect not
just their bottom line, but the human rights paradigm for others.
4. The bystander framework and the special duty of the TNC
Another aspect of the bystander framework that may disturb the
business community is that it has the potential to impose upon
corporations special duties that may in certain circumstances go beyond
the duties imposed upon States. Indeed, Ruggie flagged this as an issue
when he stated:
[T]he allocation of responsibilities under the Norms in actual
practice could come to hinge entirely on the respective capacities of
States and corporations in particular situations - so that where States
are unable or unwilling to act, the job would be transferred to
corporations. While this may be desirable in special circumstances
and in relation to certain rights and obligations, as a general
proposition it is deeply troubling.”228

By the time Ruggie submitted his Framework and began drafting
the Guiding Principles, there appeared to be a growing emergence in the
discourse that relationships would need to be at the heart of business and
human rights.229 Indeed, as noted scholar Larry Catá Backer stated:
If at least the most advanced multinational enterprises are the
functional equivalent of states, then they ought to undertake burdens
commensurate with their power and effects. . . . Mr. Ruggie makes
the quite sensible point that large and powerful enterprises cannot on
228.
229.

2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 68.
See, e.g., Juliette Terzieff, U.N. Special Rep: Time to “Know and Show,”
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trendlines/5206/u-n-special-rep-time-to-know-and-show.
[R]aising human rights or environmental rights abuses with corporations has been a
pragmatic move by activists to avoid directly challenging the role of the governments
involved. A corporation or industry can’t arrest group leaders or ban their operations.
At the same time, corporations do have power and can exert influence on
governments to improve rights conditions.

Id. (emphasis added).
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the one hand protect their power to operate unhampered within a
framework of social norm systems, and at the same time invoke their
formalist subordination to states under legal norm systems.230

To that end, the Guiding Principles, and their discussion of
relationships and spheres of influence, provide a solid theoretical basis
from which future bystander methodologies can be drawn.
D. The Failings of the Guiding Principles
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which the Guiding
Principles could be more effective. In the first interim report, Ruggie
stated that “[i]t is essential to achieve greater conceptual clarity with
regard to the respective responsibilities of States and corporations.”231
That promise was not, in fact, fulfilled in the Respect Framework or in
the Guiding Principles. Rather than articulate specifically the
responsibilities of corporations, Ruggie expressed only aspirational
goals. This may be a semantic quibble, but to the extent responsibilities
invoke something akin to a legal duty, they are clearly absent in the
Guiding Principles’ analysis of a corporation’s duties. Indeed, neither
the Respect Framework nor the Guiding Principles do anything to
remedy that governance gap. Instead, the sole legal duty continues to
fall on States, rendering the Principles incapable of remedying situations
where States are either unable or unwilling to do more to prevent their
citizens from suffering human rights abuses.232 Of course, this failing is
not unique to Ruggie’s framework. Indeed, many scholars argue that one
230. Larry Catá Backer, On Challenges to Operationalizing a Transnational
Framework for Business and Human Rights—the View From Geneva, LAW AT THE END
OF THE DAY BLOG (Oct. 13, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/10
/on-challenges-to-operationalizing.html.
231. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 70.
232. This reminds me of that famous 1980s campaign “say no to drugs,” as if by
merely stating what one should do, an issue can effectively be ended. The continued
drug epidemic in this country shows that this is not the case. Similarly, telling States
that they need to protect their citizens from human rights abuses does little to help those
individuals if the international community does not provide the tools or a culture to
make it happen. TNCs can provide both. By ascribing bystander liability to them in the
meantime, TNCs are likely to be more proactive in curbing human rights abuses.
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of the most fundamental failings of international human rights law is its
one-dimensional view of the State as the duty bearer.233 Still, this failing
is particularly exacerbated within the context of TNCs. Given how
influential TNCs are to the international legal landscape, a framework
that does not discuss them as duty bearers for human rights violations is
fundamentally flawed.
In addition, while the Respect Framework and the Guiding
Principles offer concrete guidance in the form of impact assessment and
due diligence standards, both seem hollow within a self-monitoring
system. Thus, the aspirational nature of these goals will do little to
remedy the governance gaps that exist.
Moreover, there appears to be a gap in logic between the 2008
Official Report’s remarks on corporate responsibility and the proposals
put forth in the Principles. Specifically, the 2008 Report states that
“corporate responsibility to respect rights exists independently of States’
duties.”234 Notably, the International Organisation of Employers, the
International Chamber of Commerce, and the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (“OECD”) seem to share this viewpoint. In their paper
entitled Business and Human Rights: The Role of Government in Weak
Governance Zones, the groups, while maintaining that States have
primary responsibility for issues arising out of human rights abuses, also
contend that companies still have to respect the law even if the Host
State does not.235
If that is so, then why can we not develop an accountability
framework that begins from the same—paradigms namely in which
corporate accountability (or corporate duties) exist independently of

233. See David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The U.N. Human Rights Norms for
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 447.
234. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 55.
235. INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS
IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES: BUSINESS PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVE WAYS OF
ADDRESSING DILEMMA SITUATIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES ¶ 15 (Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/596399/link_pag
e_view (“All companies have the same responsibilities in weak governance zones as
they do elsewhere. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to
respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national law is
absent.”).
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States’ duties?236 That the U.N.’s work does not even try is its main
failing.
CONCLUSION
Despite initial resistance from TNCs regarding the business and
human rights agenda, company executives now seem to understand that
allowing a corporation to be complicit in human rights violations comes
not just at a moral cost, but more than likely at a business cost as well.237
236. For instance, Ruggie believes that TNCs’ responsibilities for human rights in weak

governance zones should still be maintained even when the State itself seems unwilling
to prevent those abuses. See, e.g., Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Hum. Rts. & Transnat’l Corp. & Other Bus. Enter., 10th OECD Roundtable on
Corporate Responsibility: Updating the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
discussion paper, ¶¶ 22–23 (June 30, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/35/45545887.pdf.
Weak governance zones are one case in point. Early in his mandate, the Special
Representative asked the world’s largest international business associations to address
this particular challenge. The updated Guidelines should incorporate their response:
“All companies have the same responsibilities in weak governance zones as they do
elsewhere. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to respect
the principles of relevant international instruments where national law is absent.”
The challenge is more complex where national law conflicts with international
standards and where legal compliance may undermine the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights. Enterprises should be encouraged in such circumstances to seek
ways to respect the spirit of international standards while avoiding outright violation
of the law. At the same time, they should ensure that their actions do not exacerbate
abuses or the risks to those subject to the abuse.
Id.
237.

See, e.g., Susan Aaronson & Ian Higham, Commentary, Re-Righting Business:
John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for
Transnational Firms, Geo. Wash. U., Elliott School of Int’l Affairs (June 2011),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Individualcompanies/S/S
NCFSocitNationaledesCheminsdeFer?&batch_start=11&sort_on=sortable_title (“The
costs to the firm [for human rights abuses] may include reputational risk, legal liability,
operational risk (such as work stoppages, boycotts, blackmail, and sabotage), and loss
of investor or consumer confidence.”); Cynthia Williams & John Conley, Is There an
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (2005)
(discussing how the business lobby’s position during the Supreme Court’s first ATCA
human rights case could lead to monetary exposure for businesses that do not consider
human rights as part of their risk assessment); Jena Martin Amerson, Business and
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At the same time, much of the recent debate around corporate
accountability has centered on who is controlling the game. Most human
rights activists believe that corporations are controlling the rules of the
game and will continue to do so until such time as an accountability
structure is developed for them under international law. Ruggie, in
contrast, seems to believe that others have been controlling the game
and that TNCs will not get the results they want unless they participate
in the dialogue on business and human rights.238 In my view, the former
belief is more persuasive. As one author writes: “Of course, businesses
also spend much time and treasure attempting to influence the rules of
the game—and ensuring that any changes to the rules, however broad or
obvious their potential social benefits, do not affect their bottom
lines.”239
If we accept that corporations are indeed controlling the game, the
significance of a bystander framework is quite obvious. Using a
paradigm that has as its initial source of accountability the TNC’s
relationship with perpetrators, victims could finally have a concrete
mechanism for addressing human rights abuses in weak governance
zones. Of course, this idea is a controversial one. Holding a non-state
actor liable under international law takes a significant step away from
our current normative structure of international law. Likewise, holding
these same non-state actors liable because of their relationships, rather
than just looking at their actions, is at odds with most current theories of
international law.
In light of this uneven terrain, Ruggie’s work is a necessary interim
step in the right direction. Ruggie brokered a compromise from
disparate populations who had taken hard-line stances before his
involvement—in essence, “sneaking past the watchful dragons.”240 For
Human Rights: What’s the Board Got to Do with It?, 2013 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (arguing that businesses that fail to consider human rights as part of their due
diligence are facing huge monetary liability).
238. Interview by John Sherman, supra note 7 (discussing his approach with the
business community regarding human rights advocacy: “What I’ve said to the
companies is, I have a better game for you [than naming and shaming] . . . . [T]ake the
game over and stop being reactive, and become proactive, and drive the agenda.”).
239. Tom Zeller Jr., Can Business Do the Job All by Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/business/energy-environment/29green.html.
240. C.S. LEWIS, OF OTHER WORLDS, ESSAYS AND STORIES 56 (1966). Lewis used
the term to connote how in some cases, using a narrative to convey an idea is more
powerful than explicitly stating the idea in an expository form. In Lewis’s example, he
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instance, many of the human rights groups that had initially welcomed
the U.N. Norms realized they needed to let go of their allegiance to its
specifics and instead embrace its spirit.241 Likewise, TNCs had to be
more open to the idea that they were not only subject to the national
laws of their host States, but also could be subject to other
accountability mechanisms.242 This was an important step in establishing
buy-in from the different stakeholders. Should a bystander framework
subsequently be developed that holds TNCs accountable for their
relationships with aggressors of human rights violations (the heart of the
bystander narrative), TNCs would now be hard-pressed to object after
contributing significant input and welcoming both Ruggie’s framework
and the Guiding Principles.243
Finally, discourse on Ruggie’s work and corporate accountability
often overlooks the purpose for which Ruggie was commissioned.
Christine Bader, one of Ruggie’s advisors during his time as Special
Representative, noted that “John Ruggie was brought in to solve a
particular problem, and that is to try to prevent people from getting hurt
by corporate activity. He’s trying to ensure that there is a floor where
there was none before.”244 To that end, the Guiding Principles may very
well be “among the most important milestones in the recent era of
stated that using children’s stories to allegorize Christian theory was much more
effective than writing an apology on the subject. Likewise, Ruggie’s aspirational tones
and conciliatory methods may have been a much more effective way of creating TNC
buy-in to a human rights paradigm than simply drafting a top-down accountability
framework. Still, the jury is out regarding whether or not this method lays the
foundation for any future, meaningful accountability structure.
241. See, e.g., Chris Jochnick, Making Headway on Business and Human Rights,
OXFAM. (blog) (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/i
ndex.php/2011/02/11/making-headway-on-business-and-human-rights/ (discussing how
the human rights community’s view of Ruggie’s work has evolved).
242. Comments of Peter Frankental on the 2008 Framework. Comments part of
International Law Discussion Group Summary Business and Human Rights: Closing
the Gaps 8 (Nov. 6, 2008) available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/uk/files/12734_il
p061108.pdf.
243. See supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
244. Interview by Jonathan T. F. Weisberg with Christine Bader, Advisor to the
U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts., at the Yale School of
Management (May 2009), available at http://qn.som.yale.edu/content/how-does-busine
ss-value-human-rights.

2012]

“THE END OF THE BEGINNING?”

935

corporate responsibility and sustainability, particularly given its
emphasis on stakeholder engagement and collaboration among
government, business and civil society.”245
No doubt, then, its endorsement by the Council does indeed signal
the end of the beginning. Nonetheless, many may be left
wondering how quickly we will progress beyond that beginning.

245. March Murninghan, Human Rights: A Moral and Material Business Concern,
THE MURNINGHAN POST (June 30, 2011), http://murninghanpost.com/2011/06/30/huma
n-rights-a-moral-and-material-business-concern/.
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APPENDIX A (A TIMELINE OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS)





1993 – 1998. Human rights organizations begin shifting
their advocacy strategies to more directly include TNCs.246
1997 – 2001. John Ruggie works at the U.N. as Assistant
Secretary-General. In that capacity he helps draft both the
Millennium Goals and the Global Compact.247
1999. Kofi Annan gives his speech regarding a Global
Compact with business. 248
July 2000. The U.N. Global Compact begins with 50
signatories.249 Initially, the Compact states nine principles
(a tenth principle against corruption was added in 2004).250

246. Human rights advocates in the United States began shifting their use of ATCA
litigation from government officials to corporations, with the first lawsuit filed against a
corporation in 1993. Migueal Juan Taboada et al., The Accountability of Multinational
Corporations for Human Rights’ Violations, 64/65 CUADERNOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE
LA CÁTEDRA FADRIQUE FURIÓ CERIOL 171, 180. In addition, the first press release from
Human Rights Watch that directly named corporations as human rights violators
occurred on December 28, 1998. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, International
Corporations Violate Women’s Rights in Mexico (Dec. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/12/28/international-corporations-violate-womens-rig
hts-mexico. See Appendix B for more details. For a detailed discussion of the temporal
delineations for human rights advocates targeting business, see infra note 62 and
accompanying text.
247. John Ruggie, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/johnruggie/index.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2012).
248. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, In Address to World Economic
Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM 6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.pactomundial.org/recursos/doc/26323_1821822009135621.pdf.
249. Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a Globalized Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2000, at C19.
250. About Us: Principle 10, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.ungl
obalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle10.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
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2000. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights for the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights (now the U.N. Human Rights Council)
begins work on drafting the U.N. Norms.251
August 13, 2003. The Sub-Commission finalizes and
approves the Norms.252 It submits the Norms to the full
Commission.
April 4, 2004. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights put
on hold the resolution on the Norms due to the frosty
reception from member States.253 The Resolution also
requests that the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights compile a report on the various standards in
the area of business and human rights. 254
February 2005. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights publishes and submits a report to the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding business and
human rights. It suggests that the issue remain on the
agenda and the Norms be further considered.255
April 2005. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopts
a resolution asking the Secretary-General to create a Special
Representative.256
July 2005. Kofi Annan appoints John Ruggie for a two-year
mandate to be the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General on business and human rights.257

251. KARL-HEINZ MODER, NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS 3
n.3 (Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/U
N_Norms/25March04_UN-Norms_Background.pdf.
252. Id. at 1.
253. Kinley & Chambers, supra note 128, at 449.
254. INT’L NETWORK FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS FOR BUSINESS: BRIEFING KIT (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.escr-net.org/u
sr_doc/Briefing_Kit.pdf.
255. Id. at 459.
256. Comm’n on Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/69: Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 59th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453
77c80c.html.
257. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Annan Appoints Ruggie Special
Representative on Rights, Corporations, Businesses, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (July 29,
2005), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15212&Cr=huma
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February 22, 2006. Ruggie completes and submits his
interim report concluding that the Norms should be
abandoned rather than pursued.258
April 3, 2006. The Human Rights Council is established. It
replaces the Commission on Human Rights.259
February 8, 2007. Ruggie completes and submits his
official report entitled “Business and Human Rights:
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
Accountability for Corporate Acts.”260
April 7, 2008. Ruggie submits his second official report
entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy, a Framework for
Business and Human Rights.”261
June 18, 2008. The U.N. approves and endorses the
framework unanimously and renews Ruggie’s term under a
new mandate.262
April 22, 2009. Ruggie submits a third official report,
“Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing

n&Cr1=rights. Prior to his appointment as a Special Representative, Ruggie worked for
then Secretary-General Kofi Annan as his former Assistant Secretary-General and
senior advisor for strategic planning. Id.
258. Kinley & Chambers, supra note 128, at 450.
259. G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (April 3, 2006), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/a.res.60.251_en.pdf.
260. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l
Corps. and Other Bus. Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, Hum. Rts. Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) (by John Ruggie).
261. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l
Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business
and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John
Ruggie), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/huma
n_rights/Human_Rights_Working_Group/29Apr08_7_Report_of_SRSG_to_HRC.pdf.
262. Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus.
Enter., 28th meeting, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008), available at http://ap
.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf; see also Interview
with John Sherman, supra note 7.
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the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” to the U.N.
Human Rights Council.263
April 9, 2010. Ruggie submits “Business and Human
Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” to the U.N.
Human Rights Council.264
March 21, 2011. Ruggie submits “Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.”265
June 16, 2011. The U.N. Human Rights Council
unanimously adopts the Principles.266

263. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights:
Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts.
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf.
264. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and
Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business and Human Rights: Further Steps
Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie),
available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf.
265. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and
Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pd
f.
266. Press Release, Human Rights Council, New Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights Endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council, United Nations
Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11164&Lang
ID=E (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
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APPENDIX B
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) is a nongovernmental organization
dedicated to research and advocacy on human rights across the world. It
regularly produces reports and press releases to expose actions of what it
considers violations of international human rights standards set by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even though typically these
press releases are against State actors, occasionally HRW challenges
corporations who may have violated human rights through their
practices. The following is a comprehensive list of press releases from
HRW against corporations, listing the date and the headline.267 Although
many of the press releases challenge the State more than any other entity
for allowing a given corporation to have such abusive practices, it
nonetheless demonstrates a trend toward advocating for corporate
accountability in human rights abuses.







Dec. 28, 1998
“International Corporations Violate Women’s Rights in
Mexico.”
Jan. 20, 1999
“Computer Industry Must Speak Out On Chinese Internet
Case”
June 25, 2000
“China: Foreign Companies Should Protest Internet
Detention”
Dec. 20, 2000
“Human Rights Principles for Oil and Mining Companies
Welcomed”
Jan. 30, 2001
“Egypt: Cotton Co-Ops Violate Child Labor Laws”
Jan. 22, 2002
“Enron: History of Human Rights Abuse in India”

267. The press releases can be found on the Human Rights Watch website:
http://www.hrw.org/news/list/40 (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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Feb. 11, 2002
“Guatemala: Women and Girls Face Job Discrimination”
May 21, 2002
“Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Workers”
June 11, 2002
“ILO Members Urged to Take Action on Child Labor in
Agriculture”
Aug. 9, 2002
“Yahoo Risks Abusing Rights in China”
Aug. 12, 2003
“U.N.: New Standards for Corporations and Human Rights”
Oct. 26, 2003
“D.R. Congo: U.N. Must Address Corporate Role in War”
June 21, 2006
“Indonesia: Military Business Threatens Human Rights”
Aug. 10, 2006
“China: Internet Companies Aid Censorship”
Feb. 16, 2007
“Indonesia: Government Should Pull Military Out of
Business”
Apr. 30, 2007
“US: Wal-Mart Denies Workers Basic Rights”
Aug. 26, 2008
“Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers Dying Every Week”
Oct. 27, 2008
“Burma: US Consumers Should Avoid Banned Gems” (not
directly corporate-related but it affects jewelers)
June 19, 2009
“China: Filtering Software Challenges Computer Industry”
Jan. 12, 2010
“China: Google Challenges Censorship”
Sept. 2, 2010
“Saudi Arabia: Domestic Worker Brutalized”
Sept. 2, 2010
“US: European Corporate Hypocrisy”
May 9, 2011
“Kazakhstan: Philip Morris International Overhauls Labor
Protections”

